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WORKER PRODUCTIVITY AS A FUNCTION OF THE PERCENTAGE
OF MONETARY INCENTIVES TO BASE PAY

Carol J. Frisch, Ph JD.
Western Michigan University, 1996

Several studies have shown that individuals working under pay conditions
with monetary incentives have higher levels of productivity than individuals working
for non-incentive pay, such as hourly wages (Abernathy, Duffy, & O’Brien, 1982;
Dierks & McNally, 1987; Farr, 1976; Gaetani, Hoxeng, & Austin, 1986; George &
Hopkins, 1989; London & Oldham, 1977; Orpen, 1982; Nebeker & Neuberger, 1985;
Terborg & Miller, 1978; Yukl, Wexley, & Seymore, 1972). It has also been noted that
a minimum of 30% incentive is generally accepted as necessary to affect (employee)
motivation (Fein, 1970), and increasing incentives above this level will not result in
appreciable increases in employee performance (Fein, 1970; Henderson, 1989).
The purpose of this study was: (a) to investigate the monetary incentive
continuum to determine if increases in the percentage of incentives to base pay would
result in increases in performance, as well as (b) to evaluate the accuracy of the
accepted 30% incentive standard and determine the optimum level of percentage of
incentives to base pay.
This study investigated the effects of five levels of % incentive to base pay,
i.e., 0% (no-incentive), 10%, 30%, 60%, and 100%, on worker productivity.
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Seventy-five undergraduate subjects were randomly assigned to one of five %
incentive/base pay conditions, using a between-groups experimental design. Subjects
performed a simulated production task for pay as per their assigned condition. Task
productivity and the amount of money earned were measured.
The results of this study support prior similar research in showing that pay
with incentives resulted in observationally and significantly higher levels of
performance (i.e., an average of 21% higher) than pay with no-incentives (e.g., hourly
pay). Also, subjects receiving incentives continued to show gradual increases in
performance throughout the study while the performance of no-incentive subjects
stabilized after an initial level of task proficiency was attained.
These results build on prior research in showing that the different percentages
of incentive to base pay did not result in significant differences in subject task
performance. This study challenges the generally accepted 30% incentive standard
showing that significant performance increases were obtained with as little as 5%
incentive to base pay.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The use of monetary incentive systems to influence performance “reaches
back into our earliest recorded history” with a notable increase in prevalence during
the industrial revolution, resulting from the “increased demands for efficiency and
performance” (Peach & Wren, 1992, p. 5). Today, with the increasing impact of
global competition, all methods of improving organizational productivity are gaining
critical importance. As so explicitly stated by Nebeker and Neuberger (1985), “If the
United States is to maintain its economic position in the world, its standard of living,
and control inflation, it must find ways to increase its rate of productivity
improvement” (p. 121).
Multiple factors impact organizational productivity but, as emphasized by
Nebeker and Neuberger (1985), no matter what method of organizational productivity
improvement is implemented (e.g., improved technology), “all systems .. depend
upon a motivated workforce for efficient operation” and “ proven strategies for
improving productivity need to be developed and documented” (p. 121). O’Dell
(1986) reported that, “By 1983, the problems of stagnant productivity and declining
competitiveness were so serious that a White House Conference on Productivity was
called to gather the best thinking about what needed to be done” (p. 1). One area of
recommendations from this conference “focused on the role of reward systems in
I
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2
improving competitiveness” with “pay for performance” being one of the five major
issues identified. At about the same time, Locke (1982) reported the results of a
“meta-outcomes” study comparing existing research on the effectiveness of four
employee motivation strategies, i.e., money, goal setting, job enrichment, and
participation. The results of this analysis indicated that money emerged “as the most
effective motivator” (p. 75). In 1986, in response to the above mentioned White
House Conference, the American Compensation Association conducted and published
the “National Survey on Non-Traditional Reward and Human Resource Practices.”
This survey reported that a tremendous growth in the use of non-traditional reward
systems had occurred during the previous five years, and that 75% of all firms
surveyed (1,190 out of 1,598) reported using at least one non-traditional employee
reward system, most of which were various types of monetary incentive systems
(O’Dell, 1986).
With this increasing importance and prevalence of monetary incentive
strategies to improve employee productivity comes a need for information on how to
implement such strategies effectively. Applied and experimental research,
investigating the various parameters of monetary incentives and their effectiveness on
improving worker productivity, can contribute greatly to this need for practical
knowledge.
A fairly sizable body of research currently exists evaluating the impact of
incentives on worker productivity. This research has occurred in both applied and
laboratory experimental settings and has examined the performance of different types
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of workers, in various settings, performing a variety of types of tasks. Subjects and
settings investigated include: proofing operators in a bank (Abernathy, Duffy, &
O’Brien, 1982: Dierks & McNally, 1987); tellers in a bank (Dierks & McNally,
1987); assembly workers in a factory in South Africa (Orphen, 1982); waitpersons in
restaurants (George & Hopkins, 1989); machinists in an auto machine shop (Gaetani,
Hoxeng, & Austin, 1986); small purchase buyers & supply clerks in the purchase
division of a naval shipyard (Nebeker & Neuberger, 1985); and college students in
laboratory analog work settings (Farr, 1976; London & Oldham, 1977; Terborg &
Miller, 1978; Yukl, Wexley, & Seymore, 1972). Work performance tasks or outcomes
measured include: check proofing data entry (Abernathy et al„ 1982; Dierks &
McNally, 1987); bank teller transactions (Dierks & McNally, 1987); restaurant sales
(George & Hopkins, 1989); quality control checks (Orphen, 1982); auto service
customer sales (Gaetani et al., 1986); multiple purchasing and supply clerk tasks
(Nebeker & Neuberger, 1985); a card sorting task (Farr, 1976; London & Oldham,
1977); scoring of exam cards (Yukl, et al., 1972); and tinker toy model assembling
(Terborg & Miller, 1978).
The quality of the above research varies from case studies to well controlled
between-groups and within-subjects experimental designs. The noteworthy case
studies are briefly mentioned below followed by more specific descriptions of the
research using more controlled experimental designs. Studies conducted in applied
settings are discussed first, followed by studies conducted in laboratory analog work
settings.
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One of the earliest case studies was initiated at Union National Bank in Little
Rock, Arkansas during 1978 (Abernathy et al., 1982). First feedback and then
monetary incentives were applied to improve the performance of check proofing
operators. This study reports a mean baseline rate of performance at 1,064 checks per
hour, which increased to 2,200 checks/hour under feedback, and to 2,700 checks/hour
under feedback and incentive conditions. Later in 1987, a subsequent publication
(Dierks & McNally, 1987) reported that when production had increased to 2,800
checks/hour, which was the maximum rate for which incentives were paid, the
maximum rate was raised to 3,000. Production quickly increased to that level, so the
maximum was eliminated, and performance rose even further to an average of 3,500
checks/hour, “more than three times baseline levels.” The authors report several
organizational benefits as a result of these performance improvements, most
importantly a $100,000 per year savings from processing checks faster and the related
interest savings from reduced “float”, the hiatus between the time the checks are
proofed and entered into the bank’s computer.
A second significant case study displaying the dramatic effects of monetary
incentives was reported by Nebeker and Neuberger (1985). In this study, the effects of
the “Performance Contingent Reward System" (PCRS) were evaluated on the work
performance of purchase buyers and supply clerks in the purchase division of a naval
shipyard. The PCRS was a comprehensive system that specified multiple job tasks
and standards, and provided a computerized measurement, feedback, and monetary
incentives calculation system. An example reported in this study described a
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monetary incentives earning of 3% of total earnings for one week. After a 17 week
trial implementation period, significant improvements in productivity were obtained
on almost every one of the multiple performance measures. This study also reports an
extensive analysis evaluating the costs and benefits of the PCRS program. The
authors state that “based purely on the reduction in production costs, savings
exceeded $14,000” (p. 130) for the trial period.
Three applied studies have investigated the effects of monetary incentives
using the following experimental designs: (a) a between-groups experimental design
(Orpen, 1982), (b) a within-subject reversal design (Gaetani et al., 1986), and (c) a
within-subject multiple-baseline design across settings (George & Hopkins, 1989).
Each of these studies is described below.
In the first applied study, Orpen (1982) reports examining the effects of three
different “incentive pay schemes” on the quality control checking performances of 63
assembly workers in a large auto components manufacturing company. Workers were
randomly assigned to one of three incentive conditions using a between-groups
experimental design. The incentive pay schemes were conveyed through instructions
to the three groups of workers at a special meeting on a Friday. The following week,
and for only one week, all groups performed their tasks under the incentive conditions
described. The quality control task consisted of checking batches of 10 components
each and certifying the batches as “error-free” or defective. All error-free batches
were subsequently checked to determine whether the workers’ quality control checks
were accurate. The “index” of task performance was the number of “error-free”
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batches of ten components passed by workers per week. The three incentive pay
schemes included: (1) the HI (high-incentive) group, who received 25 cents for every
batch of 10 components passed which were error-free; (2) the LI (low-incentive)
group who had a 25% chance of receiving 100 cents for every error-free batch of
components passed (i.e., when completed with checking a batch of 10 components the
worker guessed the flip of 2 coins and if correct, would receive 100 cents); and (3) the
NI (nonincentive) group who received 25 cents for every batch of 10 components
checked and passed regardless of whether or not the batch was actually error-free. The
amount of pay received was compared across the three groups and it was determined
that these amounts did not differ significantly between groups, thus the results could
not be attributed to differences in pay amounts. Due to the fact that the three groups
were measured to have different performance levels during the pre-incentive week,
task performance “gain scores” were used as the unit of measurement and analysis
between experimental conditions. Gain scores were calculated by subtracting the
subjects’ “error-free output” during the no-incentive week from their error-free output
during the incentive week. The analysis of the mean gain scores for the three groups
revealed that the performance of the workers in the HI group was significantly greater
than that of the workers in the LI group, whose performance was significantly greater
than that of the NI group. The author concludes that “This finding is consistent with
the prediction derived from the operant conditioning literature ... in order to influence
task performance significantly, pay must be made contingent upon performance” (p.
148).
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Unfortunately, the total amount in incentives earned by workers in this study
is not reported, nor is the work amount or type of base pay. Thus it is not possible to
determine what percent of the workers’ total pay was earned in incentives and how
this relates to work performance during this study. An educated guess would indicate
that the proportion of incentives to total pay was probably very small. The major
problem with this study is that it occurred for only one week which greatly limits the
generality of the findings.
In the second applied study, Gaetani et al. (1986) implemented and evaluated
the effects of a feedback and commissioned payment intervention on the performance
of two machinists in an auto machining shop, who were traditionally paid with hourly
wages. This intervention was implemented in four phases using an ABAC withinsubjects design. The daily dollar amount charged to customers for work performed by
the machinists was the dependent variable. Phase one served as a 30 day baseline
period in which the machinists were paid with their traditional hourly pay. During
phase two a feedback procedure was implemented for 13 days in which the
machinists self-generated a daily report of dollars charged for the day. Phase three
was a reversal of the feedback procedure for seven days, i.e., a return to baseline
conditions, with the owner of the shop refusing to continue this phase any longer. In
phase four, which occurred for 40 days, the commissioned compensation contingency
plus feedback was implemented in which the machinists earned a five percent
commission on the daily dollar value of the amount charged to customers that
exceeded a pre-set standard. This standard was based on the machinists’ customer
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charges for the six week period prior to phase four. More specifically, during this
phase: (a) if the machinists’ performance equaled the standard, they earned their
regular hourly wages; (b) if their performance was below standard, the ratio of actual
to standard performance was determined and they received an equivalent lesser
proportion of their regular wages using this ratio; and (c) if their performance was
above standard they earned the five percent commission on the dollar value over
standard. Quality of performance was addressed in two ways: (1) the owner made
periodic quality control inspections, and (2) work could be rejected by customers. If
work did not meet quality standards, the responsible machinist was required to redo
the work with no commission for the time spent doing rework. The results of this
intervention, measured as average dollars per day charged to customers by each
machinist, were as follows: (a) phase one baseline, $77.10 and $98.23; (b) phase two
feedback, $152.00 and $186.00; (c) phase three return to baseline, $152.00 and
$147.30; and (d) phase four feedback plus commission compensation, $238.00 and
$269.00, respectively. The percentage increases over baseline reported for the
commission compensation condition were reported as 209% and 174% for the two
machinists. The investigators also measured the increase in dollars realized by the
business as a result of implementing the commission compensation, which was
calculated to be approximately $14,400, while only a total of $660 were paid out in
commissions.
The authors did not determine a percent incentive earned by the workers but
that can be easily calculated from the data reported in this study. A total of $660 in
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commission was paid to the two machinists over a 40 day period for an average of
$16.50 commission per day for both workers combined. In comparing this amount of
performance incentive to the regular daily wages also earned by the two machinists,
which were reported to be a total of $96 combined for both machinists, this would be
equivalent to a 17.2% average incentive to base pay. Unfortunately there is not
enough information available in this study to determine if the incentive levels were
similar or different for both machinists (The study reports differing amounts of
regular or base pay for each machinist and the performance data reveals different
amounts of earning, but it is not clear which amounts are to be correlated with each
other.).
In the third applied study, George and Hopkins (1989) investigated the effects
of daily feedback combined with a pay system which paid seven percent of gross
sales on the performance of 29 waitpersons in three different restaurants. The
researchers implemented a multiple-baseline design across settings with 10
waitpersons in restaurant A, 9 in restaurant B, and 10 in restaurant C. Baseline began
at week 1 for all restaurants with the intervention beginning at week 7 for restaurant
A, week 9 for restaurant B, and week 11 for restaurant C. During baseline conditions,
waitpersons worked for hourly wages. Most waitpersons earned $ 1.90 per hour with a
few earning above this amount, the highest paid earning $3.50 per hour. During the
intervention conditions, the hourly wage was discontinued and the waitpersons were
paid seven percent of the daily total dollars they sold. Data was aggregated for all
waitpersons by restaurant using the following measures: (a) mean dollars (sales) per
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hour worked, (b) number of customers served per labor hour, (c) sales per labor hour
(or labor costs per dollar of sales), and (d) labor costs for waitpersons as a percentage
of gross sales. Mean dollars earned per hour worked increased from $2.10, $2.08, and
$2.17 during baseline to $2.72, $2.50, and $2.70 during the incentive intervention, for
30%, 20%, and 24% increases, in restaurants A, B, and C, respectively. The number
of customers served per labor hour increased from 14.2, 11.9, and 12.9 during
baseline to 17.6, 14.1, and 16.2, for 24%, 19%, and 26% increases, in the three
restaurants. Sales per labor hour were measured as a percentage of historical data
collected one year earlier in each restaurant. Sales per labor hour, as compared to the
same from the prior year, were 118%, 116%, and 113% during baseline and 161%,
137%, and 154% during the intervention, for the three restaurants. The authors noted
that the majority of the sales per labor hour increases were due to increases in the
numbers of customers served per labor hour rather than increases in purchases by
customers in each restaurant. Lastly, the labor costs for waitpersons as a percentage of
gross sales averaged 7.8%, 7.2%, and 7.8% during baseline and decreased slightly to
7.2%, 6.9%, and 7.3%, for restaurants A, B, and C, respectively. The authors
concluded that: (a) the performance-contingent pay improved productivity primarily
through the waitpersons’ serving more customers per hour; (b) the increased pay for
waitpersons were financed at “no cost” to the company, i.e., due to increases in sales;
although (c) no important decreases in labor costs occurred as compared to dollars of
sales, which would have been beneficial to the owners. Anecdotally and
unfortunately, the owners of this restaurant chain filed for bankruptcy soon after the
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completion of this study. In this study, the pay for waitpersons changed from an
hourly wage system to a percent of sales pay system which resulted in 100% of the
waitpersons’ pay being incentive based.
Four laboratory studies (Farr, 1976; London & Oldham, 1977; Terborg &
Miller, 1978; Yukl et al., 1972) have investigated the effects of monetary incentives,
each using a variation of a between-groups experimental design. Unfortunately, the
generality of each of these studies is limited due to the typical problems inherent in
conducting laboratory research related to applied research questions (i.e., artificial
work environment, student subjects, simple work tasks, short work sessions, small
amounts of pay which is usually discretionary, etc.). Each of these studies is described
below.
In the first laboratory study, Yukl et al. (1972) compared the effects of three
monetary incentive “reinforcement schedules.” Subjects were 15 females hired
through a university placement office to perform part-time work at one of three
predetermined daily time slots. Subjects were assigned to experimental groups
according to the work time they selected. Thus it was not possible to randomly assign
subjects to groups, but the groups were randomly assigned to the experimental
conditions. The task performed was scoring batches of 60 answer cards used in a 25item multiple-choice exam and writing each score beside a name on a computer
printout listing of names. Subjects worked in isolation at desks in a business office
setting for one hour per day for two weeks. Subjects were paid a rate of $1.50 per
hour throughout the two weeks of the study with incentives added to the hourly rate
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during the second week. Thus, the first week served as an hourly rate only or no
incentive period. At the beginning of the second week, one incentive condition was
implemented with each group as follows: (a) a $.25 incentive (i.e., piece-rate) for each
batch completed, identified as a “continuous reinforcement schedule (CRF)”; (b) a
50% chance of a $.25 incentive, based upon correctly guessing a coin toss upon
completion of each batch, identified as a “$.25-variable ratio schedule ($.25-VR2)”;
and (c) a 50% chance of a $.50 incentive, based upon correctly guessing a coin toss
upon completion of each batch, identified as a “$.50- variable ratio schedule ($.50VR2)”. (Readers are referred to Dickinson & Poling, 1996, for a discussion of the use
of traditional reinforcement schedule names, that originally characterized the
performance of nonhumans in basic research studies, to identify applied setting
contingencies, to which there are little commonalities.) Subjects were paid by check
at the end of two weeks for both the hourly pay earned for the two weeks and the
incentives earned for the second week. The authors note that for the two groups that
had the 50% chance of receiving the incentive, the actual average rates of incentive
reinforcement were 43% for the S.25-VR2 group and 51% for the $.50-VR2 group.
An analysis of subject performance between week one (hourly pay only) and week
two (hourly pay plus incentives) was not conducted but sizable performance increases
are noted in the mean daily output data for each group as follows: (a) from 197 to 269
for the $.25-CRF group, (b) from 244 to 320 for the $.25-VR2 group, and (c) from
250 to 362 for the $.50-VR2 group. Thus hourly pay with incentives resulted in
sizable performance increases over hourly pay alone. Due to the variation in average
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daily scores between groups during week one, “gain scores” between weeks one and
two were used for the analysis of the effects between incentive groups. Gain scores in
mean average daily output between the two weeks for each group were as follows: (a)
72 for the S.25-CRF group, (b) 76 for the $.25-VR2 group, and (c) 112 for the $.50VR2 group. The analysis of these results indicated that: (a) the S.50-VR2 group had
significandy higher production gains than both the S.25-CRF and the S.25-VR2
groups, and (b) the production gains for the S.25-CRF and the $.25-VR2 were
approximately equal.
Using the data identified above, an average % incentive to base pay can be
calculated for each group based on the average daily mean (ADM) scores during the
incentive condition as follows: [ADM incentive score -*• 60 cards per batch x
incentive amount of .25 or .50 x actual % rate of reinforcement (100% for the $.25CRF group, 43% for the S.25-VR2 group, and 51 % for the $.50-VR2 group)]

$1.50

(the hourly base pay rate). This formula reveals the following % incentive to base pay
rates for each group in the above study: (a) 75% for $.25-CRF, (b) 38% for $.25-VR2
and (c) 103% for S.50-VR2. The calculations used to obtain these % incentives are as
follows, respectively: (a) [(269

60 x .25 x 100%= 112) -s- 1.50 = 75%], (b) [(320

60 x .25 x 43% = 57) - 1.50 = 38%], and (c) [(362 - 60 x .50 x 51% = 154)

1.5 =

103%]. Thus, in this study, 103% incentives improved performance more than the
75% or 38%, which had equivalent effects on performance.
In the second laboratory study, Farr (1976) compared the effects of the
presence and absence of individual and group incentives on subject productivity using
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a two-by-two factorial design. Subjects were 144 introductory psychology students
who worked in three-person groups on a card sorting task for two-20 min periods
during a single experimental session. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the
following four experimental conditionsr(l) differential-distribution group incentive
(both individual an group incentives) in which pay was determined by total group
productivity and divided differentially among group members according to individual
performance levels, i.e., one-half to the subject with the highest level, one-third to the
subject with next highest level, and one-sixth to the remaining subject; (2) equaldistribution group incentive (no individual incentive) in which pay was also
determined by total group productivity but was divided equally among the three
group members; (3) individual incentive/piece rate pay (no group incentive) in which
pay was based upon individual task performance; and (4) hourly pay (no individual
nor group incentives) in which subjects were paid $ 1.80 for the one hour session of
participation. The author reported that the amounts earned between incentive and
hourly conditions were “generally comparable.” Both individual and group incentives
resulted in significantly higher performance than hourly pay. The highest level of
productivity was noted in the individual plus group incentives condition but this
condition was also perceived by subjects as being the least fair. “Subjects in the
conditions with no group incentives (i.e., piece rate or hourly pay) perceived the pay
system to be more equitable and fair than did subjects in the group incentive
conditions” (p. 167). Pay satisfaction was also evaluated using a self-report rating
scale but no differences in satisfaction were noted between pay conditions.
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In the third laboratory study, London and Oldham (1977) compared the
effectiveness of three group and two individual incentive pay conditions using a
between-groups design. Seventy male students, enrolled in an introductory
organizational behavior course, participated in this study in noninteracting pairs (i.e.,
isolated from each other). The subjects performed a card sorting task for four 5-min
trials during a single session and were given course credit, as well as their earned
incentive pay, for participation. The three group piece-rate pay conditions were: (a)
pay based on the highest performer, (b) pay based on the lowest performer, and (c)
pay based on the average group performance. The two individual pay conditions
were: (a) piece-rate pay and (b) fixed-rate pay. Pay, for all three group pay conditions
and the one individual incentive piece-rate conditions, was $.01 for every card sorted,
and pay for the individual fixed-rate condition was $.50 per trial no matter how many
cards were sorted. Performance was significantly higher with the group high
performance piece-rate and the individual piece-rate conditions in comparison to all
the other pay conditions.
In the fourth laboratory study, Terborg & Miller (1978) investigated the
effects of piece rate and hourly pay systems as well as goals on the quantity and
quality of performance of student subjects in a laboratory setting. Sixty male subjects
were hired for 2 hours with one hour being spent assembling complex tinker toy
models and one hour spent in pre- and post assembly interviews. Half of the subjects
were assigned to the piece rate pay condition and were paid $.40 per model during 1
hour of assembly and half were paid $2.50 for the hour regardless of the number of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

models assembled. The values of the pay systems were set such that average
performance would result in equivalent pay between the two pay conditions. Subjects
were also assigned to one of three goal conditions: quantity production goals, quality
goals, or no goals. This resulted in a 2 X 3 “crossed” between-groups design with 10
subjects randomly assigned to each experimental condition. Quantity of performance
was measured by counting the number of completed and partially completed models.
Quality of performance was measured by supervisor ratings of the completed models.
Effort was measured by self-ratings, supervisor ratings, and ratings of films taken of
the assembly performance. Results indicated that the type of pay affected the quantity
and effort of performance while goal setting affected the quantity and quality of
performance. The piece rate pay condition resulted in significantly greater quantity
performance than the hourly pay condition. The three measures of effort were also
greater for subjects in the contingent pay condition. The pay conditions did not appear
to influence performance quality. Quality of performance was influenced by assigned
quality goals, as was quantity of performance by assigned quantity goals.
The consistent finding across all applied and laboratory studies described
above is that monetary incentives show substantial increases in productivity over
hourly pay. This finding has been replicated over a broad set of experimental
conditions and a variety of subjects, work settings, and work tasks. Thus, one can be
confident that monetary incentives are a worthwhile employee productivity
improvement strategy.
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The details of the incentive arrangements vary greatly across studies, and
comparative parametric studies of potentially important variables are rare. One
specific example is the actual percentage of total earnings that are incentives. As
calculated and specified where possible within the studies above, a rather wide range
of incentive percentages are included in these studies: (a) 3% incentive to base pay
(Nebeker & Neuberger, 1985) (b) 17.2% incentive to base pay (Gaetani et al., 1986),
(c) 100% commission (George & Hopkins, 1989), and (d) 38%, 75%, and 103%
incentives to base pay (Yukl et al., 1972). Fein (1970) reports that the generally
accepted “incentive potential” to affect motivation in American industry is 30%, and
that incentive rates above 30% will not result in appreciable increases in employee
performance. The broad spectrum of % incentives listed above, from 3% to 103%, is
enough to begin to question this generally accepted standard. Thus, to meet the
current need for information on how to effectively implement monetary incentive
strategies, further research should identify and systematically investigate the
significant parameters of this productivity improvement variable.
The current study compared the effects of five different levels of the %
incentive to base pay parameter on worker productivity in a simulated work setting.
The investigation was conducted with 75 undergraduate students who performed a
simulated production task for pay, according to their assigned experimental
conditions, in an experimental laboratory setting. The purpose of this study was
twofold: (1) to determine if increasing levels of % incentive to base pay would result
in increases in worker performance, as well as to identify if an optimum level of %
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incentive to base pay exists, i.e., a level where workers maintain maximum
performance without further significant increases; and (2) to conduct this research
under highly controlled conditions, in which all other variables are held constant so
that the effects of the different levels of monetary incentives could be legitimately
compared, and to provide a solid foundation upon which future research could build.
This study also provided a replication of prior research, but with increased
experimental rigor. The effects of pay with incentives is compared to pay with no
incentives in that one of the % incentive to base pay levels was a 0% or base pay only
condition.
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CHAPTER H

METHOD

Pilot Study

A pilot study was conducted to provide data for several experimental design
decisions for the current research, as well as to determine a number of procedural
issues. This pilot study is briefly described below, identifying the information it
provided.
Eight subjects participated in the pilot study which used a within-subjects
experimental design with changing conditions. All subjects were initially exposed to a
base pay only condition. Six of the eight subjects were then exposed to one or more
base pay plus incentives conditions with each subject receiving a different sequence
of experimental conditions. A return to base pay was implemented for two of the six
subjects after they experienced several different incentive conditions. Subjects were
paid a base amount of $2.00 for producing “widgets” during 45 min sessions with a
range from 13% to 250% incentives (to base pay) in the various incentive conditions.
The number of experimental sessions ranged from 10 to 57 per subject.
This pilot study provided information that was used in the design of the
current study in the areas described below.

19
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Task Proficiency

Subject performance on the work task revealed that an initial number of
sessions were necessary to become proficient at performing the task. Thus a learning
curve across sessions was observed in the performance data. Analysis of these data
indicated that subjects required approximately 10 sessions to reach the asymptote of
the learning curve, i.e., become proficient at the work task.
For the current study, subjects needed to be proficient in the performance of
the work task in order to isolate and evaluate the effects of the independent variable.
Only performance data that was generated once subjects were performing at their
level of task proficiency would be useful. The pilot data indicated the number of
experimental sessions that would be needed for a subject to become proficient at the
task. This number of sessions was added to the number of sessions needed for data
analysis to identify the total number of sessions needed for the current research.
Minimum Performance Requirement
Although the base pay amount in the pilot study was for performing the work
task during a 45 min session, no “minimum” performance level was preestablished
nor required of the subjects. As a result, some subjects performed at a near zero
performance level. This indicated that a minimum performance requirement was
necessary to earn base pay in order to increase the probability that subjects would
indeed attempt to perform the work task. Requiring a minimum performance level
would also more closely approximate a real work situation where a worker must
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perform at some minimal acceptable level to remain employed. The procedure for
establishing the minimum performance requirement for the current study is specified
in the Experimental Design Statistics subsection below.
Potential Confounding Variable

During the pilot study, the dollar amount of the base pay was the same across
all conditions with the incentive amounts per unit of task performance varying across
the various incentive conditions. This resulted in the existence of a potential
confounding variable to the levels of the % incentive independent variable. The
confound was the total amount of money earned per session, which could vary
considerable across the various incentive conditions. To protect against the
occurrence of this potential confound, a constant was incorporated into the design of
the current study. The total amount of money to be earned for “maximum”
performance was held constant across all experimental conditions. A further
explanation of this design component can be found in the Independent Variable
section below.
Maximum Performance Level

In order to implement the constant identified above, as well as to provide a
basis for determining the actual dollar amounts for base and incentive pays for the
various conditions in the current study, data indicating the maximum performance
level on the work task were needed. The maximum performance levels across subjects
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under incentive conditions in the pilot study averaged at 120 correctly assembled
widgets per session.
Experimental Design Sequence Effects

Data obtained from the pilot study indicated that the experimental design
used, i.e., a within-subjects design with changing conditions, resulted in sequence
effects across experimental conditions. Thus it was determined that a between-groups
experimental design, with one incentive condition per group, would be more
appropriate for the current research.
Experimental Design Statistics
Two design decisions for the current study depended upon knowledge of
estimates of the mean, variance, and standard deviation of subjects’ performance on
the work task under baseline/base pay conditions. These statistics were needed: (1) to
conduct a “power analysis” to determine the number of subjects needed in each
experimental group to enable detection of a significant treatment effect, and (2) to
determine the minimum performance level to be required of subjects, as discussed
above, which was calculated as one standard deviation below the mean. The estimates
of these statistics, as obtained from pilot study, data were as follows: (a) mean = 68
widgets/45 min session, (b) variance = 324, and (c) standard deviation = 18. It was
decided to round these numbers to a mean of 70 and standard deviation of 20 for the
current study.
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Incentive Calculation Method

The calculation method to determine the dollar and cents amounts for base pay
and per widget incentive pay for each %incentive/base pay condition was designed
and refined during the pilot study. The method used in the design of the current
research is described in the Independent Variable section below.
Work Performance Task Feasibility
The pilot study indicated that subjects were able to learn to perform the
selected work task, i.e., assembling widgets, at a level of proficiency and that the
quality of performance was not affected by improvements in productivity.
Performance quality during the pilot study remained at 98% across all subjects and all
experimental conditions. It was also determined that it was possible to measure
subject performance on the work task at a high level of reliability. Interobserver
agreement on the dependent variable measure of the work task averaged at 98%.
Practical experience obtained from the implementation of the pilot study
revealed that this task was rather labor intensive to maintain. An adequate supply of
quality parts needed to be available for experimental sessions requiring widgets to be
disassembled and worn parts repaired between sessions.
Pav Amount Adequacy

Research funds to conduct both the pilot study and the current research were
limited and had to be proportioned across the number of experimental sessions needed
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to conduct these studies. Therefore the amount of money available per subject was
limited, which limited the amounts that could be allocated to the % incentive/base pay
conditions. The pilot study revealed that subjects would perform the work task for a
base pay of $2.00, or for this amount of base pay plus supplemental incentive
amounts, which fit within the amount of funds available. The same dollar amount
framework was used in the design of the % incentive/base pay conditions for the
current research.

Subjects

The number of subjects needed to detect a significant outcome in this study
was determined by conducting a power analysis, using estimated statistics obtained
from the pilot study (i.e., mean and variance). As described in the Experimental
Design section below, the design of this study included five groups of subjects which
resulted in the power analysis indicating that 15 subjects per group were necessary,
for a total of 75 subjects (i.e., 5 groups x 15 subjects/group).
Due to the large number of subjects needed, this research was conducted
across three semesters of two academic years, but within one calendar year, i.e., the
winter and spring semester of one year and the fall semester of the next year. Subjects
were recruited by research staff at several points throughout each semester from
sections of introductory psychology courses. Thus, subjects were primarily freshman
college students. Participation in this study was completely voluntary and there were
no course requirements nor course credits linked to participation.
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Not all individuals who were recruited and initiated participation in this study,
became part of the experimental groups of subjects. Twenty-nine percent of those
recruited (30 individuals) who attended at least the first experimental session, dropped
out of the study, and most individuals who dropped out did so during the first few
sessions. The mean number of sessions attended by individuals who dropped out
equaled 2.5 with a range from I to 9 sessions per individual. Twelve of the 30
subjects (40%) who dropped out never met the minimum performance requirement
and thus never received any pay, i.e., never experienced the % incentive/base pay
contingency. Individuals who dropped out provided no data because only data from
the last 5 of 15 sessions per subject were used for the analysis of results. In order to
attain 75 subjects who completed all experimental sessions, a total of 105 individuals
initiated participation in the experimental sessions with 30 discontinuing their
participation.
Before the initial experimental session each subject was briefed on the
research purpose and participation procedures, and reviewed and signed an informed
consent form (see Appendix A). During this initial process, subjects were informed
that they were free to discontinue their participation at any time. Subjects were paid
for participation in this study as is specified in the Independent Variable and
Experimental Procedures sections below. Approval to use human subjects in this
research was obtained from the University’s Human Subjects Institutional Review
Board (see Appendix B).
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Experimental Setting and Materials

Experimental sessions were conducted in three private experimental
laboratory rooms. These rooms were approximately 9’ x 4’ in size and contained a
table, chair, radio, and magazines. Subjects worked in the room alone with the door
closed during each session, although they were able to leave the room at any time.
Experimental materials included (a) widgets produced by subjects, which was
a production item made of a bolt, nuts, and washers (see Appendix C for a widget
diagram and the Dependent Variable and Work Performance Task sections for a more
detailed description); (b) a “subject packet” which included a performance feedback
graph, performance data sheet, widget (incentive) payment schedule, and payment
receipt sheet (see Appendix D for the subject packet); (c) a cash box with money; (d)
a cassette tape recorder and tape; and (e) a small blue plastic tub in which to place
completed widgets.

Experimental Design

A between-groups experimental design with five experimental groups was
used to evaluate the effect of the independent variable in this study. Each group of
subjects was exposed to one experimental condition, i.e., one level of the independent
variable. A between-groups experimental design was selected as opposed to a withinsubjects design, in which a subject would be exposed to several levels of the
independent variable interspersed with returns to baseline, primarily to control for
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order effects that would occur from sequential exposure to different levels of the
independent variable, as was observed during the pilot study.
As specified in the Subjects section above, the number of subjects needed per
experimental group was determined by conducting a power analysis, using data
obtained from the pilot study. This analysis indicated that 15 subjects were needed
per group, to enable detection of a significant effect, for a total of 75 subjects in the
five groups of this experiment. Subjects were non-randomly selected by recruiting
students from introductory psychology classes as described in the Subjects section
above. Once selected, subjects were randomly assigned to experimental groups.
Random assignment was conducted using a table of random numbers.
Based upon the number of sessions determined for a subject to become
proficient in the performance task (as observed in the pilot study) in combination with
the practicality of the time available to complete this study, a standard number of
experimental sessions was set for each subject. This standard was set at 15 sessions
per subject with each session lasting 45 min. Only data from the last five sessions for
each subject were used in the analysis of results for this research. The rationale for
using this procedure was to obtain performance data for analysis that was no longer
being influenced by the process of becoming proficient at the task, thus being
influenced solely by the independent variable.
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Dependent Variable and Work Performance Task

The work performance task consisted of a simulated production task of
producing as many “quality widgets” as possible during each experimental session.
Producing a single widget consisted of securely assembling three nuts and four
washers, three of which had colored bands on the edge from 1/2” to 1” in length, on a
bolt in the proper order. The order of assembly of parts on the bolt was as follows:
nut, red banded washer, black banded washer, red banded washer, nut, plain washer
(with no colored band), and nut. Widget assembly included arranging the washers
with colored bands in such a way that the edges on one side of the bands were lined
up. Widget quality was determined by the following criteria: (a) all parts were
assembled in the correct order; (b) the entire widget was securely assembled, i.e., no
loose parts; and (c) the colored bands on the washers were lined up on one side as
described above (the tolerance for lining up the bands was determined visually). Refer
to Appendix C for diagrams of widget parts and a correctly assembled widget. The
dependent variable measure for this work performance task was the total number of
quality widgets assembled per experimental session per subject.
The amount of money earned per subject per session was also recorded
throughout the study. These data enabled an analysis between groups of the amount of
money earned as compared to work task performance and incentive levels.
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Independent Variable

The independent variable was the percent (%) of monetary incentive as
compared to the amount of the base pay. The effects of five different levels of
incentives to base pay were evaluated: 0%, 10%, 30%, 60%, and 100% incentives.
A potential confound to the independent variable existed which was identified
as the total dollar value of the incentives and the base pay earned per subject per
session. To control for this potential confound, the total dollar value to be earned per
subject per session for maximum performance was equated across all %
incentive/base pay levels. Pilot study data indicated that the maximum performance
level under incentive conditions was 120 quality widgets per 45 min session. Earnings
of $4.00 for the maximum performance level was set across all conditions in this
study. The determination of the actual dollar amount available per subject per session
was a practical issue relating to the amount of money available to conduct the entire
study, but in actuality can be viewed to be a little bit better that paying “minimum
wage” for maximum performance.
A minimum performance standard was imposed for the base pay (i.e., 0%
incentive) condition because as explained earlier, during the pilot study, some
subjects performed at near zero levels without such a standard when paid hourly.
Using data from the pilot study, the mean performance level of subjects performing
under base pay only conditions was estimated at 70 quality widgets per session and
the standard deviation estimated to be 20 widgets. Minimum performance was set at
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one standard deviation below the mean which equaled 50 quality widgets per 45 min
session [(X = 70) - (s.d. = 20) = 50]. Producing quality widgets at this minimum
performance standard level was required in order to earn base pay in all conditions of
this study.
Establishing these constants ($4.00 for maximum performance of 120 quality
widgets and minimum performance of 50 quality widgets to earn base pay) provided a
basis for determining the actual dollar amounts of the base and incentive pay
parameter, which was the independent variable. For the five levels of the independent
variable that were investigated, the % incentive level reflected the total amount of
money to be earned in incentives for reaching maximum performance in relation to
the total amount of money allocated to base pay, holding total dollars earned constant
at $4.00 per session. For example, at the 100% incentive to base pay level, base pay
was set at $2.00 and an additional $2.00 could be earned in incentives for achieving
maximum performance, thus the incentive amount was equal to 100% the base pay
amount. At the 0% incentive level, base pay was set at $4.00 with $0.00 to be earned
in incentives, thus the incentives were 0% of the base pay. At the 30% incentive level,
base pay was set at $3.07 with $0.93 to be earned in incentives, incentives being 30%
of the base pay amount, and so on. Dollar amounts for the base and incentive pay for
all levels of the independent variable are displayed in Table I below.
Using the dollar value of the % incentive amounts for each condition, a per
widget payment amount was calculated, for payment of widgets produced above the
minimum standard of 50. The dollar value of the total pay available for incentives
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was divided by 70 (the 120 widget maximum minus the 50 widget minimum) which
provided a per widget incentive amount in “cents.” These per widget incentive
amounts are indicated in Table I below for each % incentive/base pay condition.
Incentive payment amounts beyond the maximum performance level of 120 widgets
were also calculated for all conditions because it was possible for a subject to exceed
this maximum performance level. “Widget Payment Schedules” identifying incentive
payment amounts for performance levels from 50 to 189 widgets for all %
incentive/base pay conditions can be found in Appendix E.

Table 1
Total Amounts of Base Pay, Incentive Pay, and Per Widget
Incentive for Each % Incentive to Base Pay Condition
Condition

0%

10%

30%

60%

100%

Total Earnings for
Maximum Performance

$4.00

$4.00

$4.00

$4.00

$4.00

Total Base Pay

$4.00

$3.63

$3.07

$2.50

$2.00

Total Incentive Pay

$0.00

$0.37

$0.93

$1.50

$2.00

Per Widget Incentive

$0.00

$0,005

$0,013

$0,021

$0,029

Experimental Procedures
Research Team and Tasks
Twenty-three graduate and undergraduate students assisted with the
implementation of this study and were identified as “experimenters.” Ail
experimenters were students in psychology who were interested in gaining research
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experience. Prior to performing their roles, each experimenter received training in the
tasks they would be performing. Experimenters conducted the following tasks: (a)
recruiting subjects; (b) implementing experimental sessions with subjects (which
included obtaining materials, escorting subjects to experimental rooms, explaining
experimental procedures to subjects, obtaining subjects’ consents, teaching subjects
how to perform the work task, starting and ending experimental sessions, collecting
and charting data, determining the amount of money subjects had earned, paying
subjects, and debriefing subjects upon their completion of all experimental sessions);
(c) conducting reliability checks on data collected by other experimenters; (d)
disassembling widgets and sorting and repairing widget parts; and (e) attending
weekly research team meetings. After one semester of experience with this project,
two experimenters took on additional coordinating and monitoring responsibilities
and were titled “research assistants.” Their additional responsibilities included: (a)
subject and experimenter scheduling and follow-up, (b) set-up of materials for starting
new subjects, (c) monitoring implementation of scheduled experimental sessions, and
(d) daily procedural problem solving. To maintain implementation consistency across
this large research staff, “job aids”, specifying detailed step-by-step procedures for
every task an experimenter and research assistant needed to perform, were
strategically located and always available in the experimental laboratory (to review
the job aids for each of the above procedures, refer to Appendix F).
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Experimental Sessions

Prior to the beginning of each experimental session, the experimenter needed
to complete the following tasks: (a) set up the experimental room with an adequate
supply of widget parts; (b) obtain the subject packet, cash box, plastic tub, tape
recorder and tape, and consent or debriefing form, depending on whether it was the
first or last session; and (c) await the subject’s arrival. Upon the subject’s arrival, the
experimenter escorted the subject to the experimental room and initiated the
experimental procedures, as described below.
Upon initiating participation in this study, the subject was asked to read and
sign a consent to participate. The consent briefly described the participation
requirements, indicated the amount of money the subject could expect to earn,
clarified that participation was voluntary and the subject could withdraw at any time,
and gave further contacts for questions or more information (for the consent letter and
form, see Appendix A). If the subject consented to participate in this research, the
experimenter first turned on the tape recorder and then read a script to the subject
which explained the following: (a) the purpose of the research project; (b) that the
subject would be asked to assemble widgets during 45 min sessions; (c) that the
experimenter would count the number of good widgets assembled at the end of the
session, record the number on a graph, pay the subject, and ask the subject to sign a
receipt; (d) that the subject could look at any of the materials in the subject packet
(which included the graph, data sheet, widget payment schedule, and receipt form) at
any time before or after the session (for subject packet see Appendix D); (e)
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instructions explaining how to correctly assemble a widget; and (f) the base pay
amount the subject would receive for assembling the minimum of 50 widgets and the
per widget incentive amount for each widget produced above the minimum (i.e., the
subjects widget payment schedule). Following the widget assembly instructions (item
e above), the subject practiced assembling five widgets and the experimenter
immediately evaluated them as correctly or incorrectly assembled, identifying for the
subject the specific characteristics that made the widgets correct or incorrect. To
review the script read by the experimenter, refer to the job aid in Appendix F titled
“Experimenter Instructions and Script for First Session.” Upon completion of the
script and the subject’s indication that s/he fully understood the instructions, the
experimenter turned off the tape recorder and initiated the procedure to begin the
experimental session.
At the beginning of each experimental session, the experimenter reminded the
subject of the widget payment schedule and asked if the subject would like to see the
schedule before beginning. The experimenter then instructed the subject to start
widget production, noted the subject’s start time, left the experimental room, shut the
door, and determined the time to stop the subject. A radio and magazines were
available in the experimental room during all sessions to approximate the availability
of “distractors” that could exist in a real work environment. The subject was also free
to leave the experimental room at any time during the session to take a break. Breaks
taken by subjects were not monitored, although anecdotal reports by experimenters
indicated that they seldom occurred.
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Upon completion of the 45 min session, the experimenter reentered the
experimental room and instructed the subject that it was time to stop. The
experimenter immediately turned on the tape recorder, stated his/her name and subject
and session numbers and completed the following tasks in the presence of the subject:
(a) counted the number of correctly and incorrectly assembled widgets, being careful
to refrain from making any judgmental statements (i.e., praise or criticism); (b)
identified the specific characteristics for any widget judged as incorrect; (c) recorded
the counts on the data form and plotted the number correct on the graph; (d)
determined the subject’s pay as per the widget payment schedule; and (e) paid the
subject, having the subject sign a receipt. The experimenter then reminded the subject
of the next session or if it was the subject’s last session, the experimenter provided
the subject with a debriefing form (see Appendix G). Following the subject’s
departure, the experimenter turned off the tape recorder, carefully placed the widgets
in the plastic tub, and carried them to the reliability area of the laboratory. For a more
specific description of steps completed before, during, and after the experimental
session, refer to the job aids in Appendix F.
As noted above, during the initial part of the first experimental session and at
the completion of all sessions, all interactions between the experimenter and subject
were audio taped. Experimenters were instructed to remain socially neutral at ail
times in relation to the subject’s performance on the work task, i.e., not to give any
form of social consequence like praise or criticism, so as not to confound the
independent variable with a socially reinforcing or punishing contingency. All
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interactions were monitored with the audio tape as a reminder to the experimenters of
this as well as to provide a mechanism to randomly monitor these interactions and,
thus, enable detection of any unplanned consequences.
Interobserver Agreement

Experimental procedures were established in such a way that a second
independent observer was able to recount the number of good widgets produced for
almost all experimental sessions. All experimenters assisted in doing these “reliability
checks.” At the end of each experimental session, the experimenter placed all widgets
produced by the subject in a tub, attached a label indicating the subject and session
numbers, and placed the tub in the reliability area of the laboratory to await the
second counting. A second experimenter would later select one or more widget tubs
and recount the number of good widgets in each tub and write the count(s) on the
interobserver agreement form (for procedural steps refer to “Job Aid for Conducting
Reliability” in Appendix F). The percent of interobserver agreement for each session
was later calculated by the project director. Percent agreement was calculated by
dividing the total number of agreements by the total number of agreements plus
disagreements, then multiplying by 100. At the end of this study, the mean agreement
for all sessions was also calculated.
Due to the variations in widget parts (the painted bands on the washers) and to
the large number of experimenters collecting data and conducting reliability checks,
the potential for disagreements in evaluating widget quality was substantial. Thus,
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reliability training was held during each weekly research team meeting with all
experimenters. Training consisted of (a) reviewing the % agreement achieved for all
experimenters and all sessions for the prior week, as well as comparing it to the %
agreement for all prior weeks and (b) practicing and troubleshooting reliability
checks. This practice consisted of all experimenters independently rating the quality
of approximately 20 widgets, comparing scores with each other, discussing the
discrepancies observed in the ratings, reviewing widget standards, and establishing
consensus rules for making decisions on variations and nuances in widget quality.
Widgets used for this training were selected from widgets produced by subjects
throughout the week. Weekly reliability training was conducted throughout the entire
study and the weekly % interobserver agreement was posted on a feedback graph in
the reliability area of the laboratory.
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CHAPTERm

RESULTS

Interobserver Agreement

The quality of the subject performance measures used to evaluate the effects
of the % incentive/base pay variable is reflected in the following interobserver
agreement data. Interobserver agreement was calculated for 97% of all experimental
sessions conducted (or approximately 1,090 of 1,122 sessions). Figure I displays the
mean interobserver agreement for all sessions by week across the three semesters, or
the 25 weeks of this study. Mean percent agreement per week ranged from 90% to
97% for the winter semester, 94% to 98% for the spring semester, and 94% to 98%
for the fall semester. Interobserver agreement improved and stabilized between 96%
and 98% at about middle of each semester, and remained at that level for the
remainder of the semester. The primary reason for the lower agreement at the
beginning of each semester followed by improvement in successive weeks, was due
to the addition of new experimenters to the research team and the reliability training
procedures described in the Interobserver Agreement section of the Method chapter
above. The mean interobserver agreement for all weeks of the entire study was 96%.

38
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Figure 1.

Interobserver Agreement of the Measurement of Subject Work Task
Performance Across Weeks of the Experimental Sessions.

Work Task Performance

The mean number of quality widgets produced by each group of subjects
across the 15 sessions of this study is displayed in Figure 2. An observational analysis
of these data indicates the following:
1.

As predicted from the pilot study, an initial learning curve is observed as

subjects became more proficient in assembling widgets. At approximately session 7,
the slope of this learning curve begins to level off, although the performances of the
incentive (10%, 30%, 60%, and 100%) groups continue to gradually increase
throughout all sessions whereas the performance of the no-incentive (0%) group
remains relatively stable.
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2.

The performance of the incentive groups is clearly higher than the no

incentive group throughout all sessions of the study. During the last five sessions, the
incentive groups are performing at an average of 21% higher than the no-incentive
group.
3.

The performances of the incentive groups appear to be relatively similar

to each other; there appears to be no observational difference in performance level as
a function of the % incentive/base pay conditions.
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Figure 2.

Mean Number of Quality Widgets Produced Per Subject by Each %
Incentive/Base Pay Group Across Experimental Sessions.

To determine if the incentive/base pay variable had a statistically significant
effect on the performance of the subjects, an analysis of variance was conducted using
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the pooled group means for the last five sessions of the study for each group. As
discussed previously, only data from the last five sessions were analyzed due to the
subjects’ levels of task proficiency. The results of this analysis are provided in the
source table displayed in Table 2 which indicates that the results of this study were
significant at the p<.007 level. The pooled group means and standard deviations from
this analysis are provided in Table 3, which supports the similarities and differences
noted observationally in items 2 and 3 above.

Table 2
Results of the Analysis of Variance Conducted on the Pooled Means
of the Number of Quality Widgets Produced Over the Last Five
Sessions by Subjects in Five % Incentive/Base Pay Groups
Source

DF

SS

MS

F

P

Factor

4

4129

1032

3.84

0.007

Error

70

18808

269

Total

74

22936

Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of the Number of Quality Widgets
Produced by Subjects During the Last Five Sessions
by % Incentive/Base Pay Group
Group

0%

10%

30%

60%

100%

Mean

68.7

87.2

84.5

88.7

87.4

Standard
Deviation

15.1

14.4

17.9

17.6

16.8
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An observational analysis of the individual performance data for each subject,
indicated that a few subjects’ performances were “atypical” when compared to the
performances of the other subjects in their groups as well as to their groups’ mean
performance levels. Six out of the 75 subjects in the study, or 8% of all subjects, were
identified as having atypical performances. Two atypical subjects were identified in
the 0% group, both of whom had performance levels substantially higher than their
group mean. One atypical subject was identified in the 30% group, one in the 60%
group, and two in the 100% group, all of whom had performances substantially lower
than their respective group means. No atypical performers were identified in the 10%
group. Figure 3 displays the performances of each atypical subject in relation to their
respective group means. The group means in these graphs have been recalculated to
exclude the atypical subject data.
Figure 4 is a reproduction of Figure 2 above but using the recalculated group
means with the atypical subject data removed. Note that, beginning with session
seven, the performance levels of the 10% and 30% groups separate from the
performance levels of the 60% and 100% groups. With the atypical subject data
removed, the subjects in the 60% and 100% groups produced a mean of 4.7 more
widgets, from sessions seven through 15 than the subjects in the 10% and 30% groups
- a small but notable difference.
The analysis of variance was recalculated using the pooled group means for
the last five sessions for each group with the atypical subject data removed. The
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44
0% Group

100

10% Group

*o
©
o3
TJ
O
w

30% Group
60% Group

CL

100% Group

03

©
O)

2

(0
3
a
w
<D
■Q

E

3

2
c

CO
<D
2

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

Sessions

Figure 4.

Mean Number of Quality Widgets Produced Per Subject by Each %
Incentive/Base Pay Group With Atypical Subjects Removed Across
Experimental Sessions.

results of this analysis are displayed in the source table in Table 4 which indicates an
even greater level of significance at the p<.001 level. The pooled group means and
standard deviations are provided in Table 5, which reveals the following as a result of
removing the atypical subject data: (a) a decrease in the standard deviation for all
groups, most notably for the 0% group (from s.d.=15.1 to s.d.=7.6), (b) a clear
increase in the differences between the group performance means across all sessions
for the no-incentive as compared to the incentive groups (with an average of 29%
difference during the last five sessions), and (c) the means for the 10% and 30%
groups clearly differentiate from the means for the 60% and 100% groups.
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Table 4
Results of the Analysis of Variance Conducted on the Pooled Means
of the Number of Quality Widgets Produced Over the Last Five
Sessions by Subjects in Five % Incentive/Base Pay
Groups With Atypical Subject Data Removed
Source

DF

SS

MS

F

P

Factor

4

7112

1778

9.31

0.000

Error

64

12221

191

Total

68

19333

Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations of the Number of Quality Widgets Produced
by Subjects During the Last Five Sessions by % Incentive/Base
Pay Group With Atypical Subject Data Removed
0%

10%

30%

60%

100%

Mean

63.7

87.2

86.7

91.0

91.9

Standard
Deviation

7.6

14.4

16.3

15.8

12.7

Percent Incentive/Base Pay Earnings

Figure 5 displays the mean pay earned by subjects in each group across all
sessions of the study. Note that subjects in the 0% incentive or no-incentive/base pay
only group earned the highest mean pay per session while subjects in 100% incentive
group earned the lowest mean pay per session, with the remaining incentive groups
earning amounts in between in inverse order to their incentive percentage. In relating
these data to the performance levels of the different groups, subjects with the lowest
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performance level, the 0% group, earned the largest amount of pay, and subjects with
the higher performance levels, earned lesser amounts of pay. This relationship
provides evidence that the incentive independent variable was not confounded by the
amount of money earned.
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Figure 5.

Mean Total Pay Earned Per Subject by Each % Incentive/Base Pay Group
Across Experimental Sessions.

The differences in the total amount of earnings by incentive group is partially
an artifact of the manner in which the incentive schedules were designed. As
previously described in the Method chapter, Independent Variable section, to control
for the potential confound of magnitude of earnings, equivalent earnings ($4.00) were
set for the maximum performance level (120 widgets) per session across all %
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incentive conditions, from which the base pay and per widget incentive amounts were
determined. This resulted in decreasing amounts of base pay and increasing amounts
of per widget incentive pay with the increasing % incentive conditions. Thus, for
equivalent performances below the maximum performance level, the greater the %
incentive condition, the less pay that would be earned. For example, for producing 90
widgets in a session, a subject in the 0%, 10%, 30%, 60%, and 100% groups would
earn $4.00, $3.83, $3.59, $3.34, and $3.16, respectively. Only after by-passing the
maximum performance level would a subject in the higher % incentive conditions
earn more than a subject in the lower % incentive conditions, because the per widget
incentive amount is larger. For example, for producing 130 widgets in a session a
subject in the 0%, 10%, 30%, 60%, and 100% groups would earn $4.00, $4.03, $4.11,
$4.18, and $4.32, respectively. Note, that in the 0% incentive condition, subjects
would always earn $4.00 regardless of performance level as long as it was at the
minimum level or above. Only two subjects exceeded the maximum performance
level in this study, one subject (in the 60% group) producing 123 widgets during
session 12 and the other subject (in the 30% group) producing 121, 122, and 121
widgets during sessions 8 ,1 1, and 14, respectively. Two other subjects met the
maximum performance level for one session each, during session 12 for one subject
(in the 60% group) and session 15 for the other subject (in the 10% group). Thus,
during only six sessions out of the total of 1,122 sessions that were conducted in this
study, did subjects meet or exceed the maximum performance level. This resulted in
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group means for performance and earnings, which were the units of data analysis in
this study, that were always below the maximum performance level.
As indicated above, the design of the % incentive to base pay dollar amounts
in each condition were based upon the subject attaining maximum performance (120
widgets/session). During most sessions subjects did not attain this maximum
performance level. Thus, the actual % incentive to base pay amounts experienced by
the subjects in this study were less than that indicated by the experimental conditions
to which they were assigned. Within a condition, the % incentive to base pay amounts
also varied between subjects because of the subjects different levels of performance.
Table 6 identifies the range of actual % incentive to base pay levels experienced by
the subjects in each group as well as the actual mean % incentive experienced, for the
group as a whole. Excluding the 0% or no-incentive group, the figures in this table
indicate that, on the average, the subjects in each group experienced a % incentive
level that was about half of the incentive level designed in this study, with
considerable variability in what each subject experienced as an individual. Table 7
displays the same figures as Table 6 with the data for the atypical subjects removed.
Note that the means are slightly higher and the individual variability becomes
increasingly less in the 30%, 60%, and 100% groups, respectively.

Summary

The interobserver agreement measures indicate that the quality of the subject
performance data is high. Task proficient subjects who received base pay with
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Table 6
Means and Ranges of the Actual % Incentive to Base Pay Earned by Subjects
During the Last Five Sessions by % Incentive/Base Pay Group
Group

0%

10%

30%

60%

100%

Mean

0%

5.3%

14.7%

32.8%

54.1%

Range

0%

i.3%-8.5%

1.8%-29.7%

5.8%-55.3%

5.4%-87.9%

Table 7
Means and Ranges of the Actual % Incentive to Base Pay Earned by Subjects
During the Last Five Sessions by % Incentive/Base Pay Group
With Atypical Subject Data Removed
Group

0%

10%

30%

60%

100%

Mean

0%

5.3%

15.7%

34.7%

60.7%

Range

0%

1.3%-8.5%

5.2%-29.7%

13.2%-55.3% 34.6%-87.9%

incentives had clearly higher performance levels than task proficient subjects who
received base pay with no incentives. This performance difference was statistically
significant. A similar performance difference occurred during sessions when subjects
were learning to become task proficient. Subjects who received incentives showed a
continuously increasing rate of performance, beyond reaching task proficiency, across
all sessions, whereas the performance of no-incentive subjects leveled off once they
reached their initial level of proficiency.
The increasing % incentive to base pay levels did not differentially affect the
levels of subject work task performance. Subject performance levels were relatively
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similar across all incentive groups. Although, when the atypical subjects’ data were
removed, a small performance difference was observed in which subjects in the 60%
and 100% groups produced an average of almost 5 widgets/session more than subjects
in the 10% and 30% groups. The actual % incentive/base pay levels experienced by
subjects varied within each experimental group and were up to an average of 50% less
per group than designed. Thus the increased performance level was obtained with as
little as a mean of 5% incentive in one group.
The % incentive/base pay variable was not confounded by the amount of
money earned by subjects, in fact an inverse relationship occurred between subject
performance level and amount of pay earned. Subjects who performed the highest
made the least amount of pay and subjects who performed the lowest made the most
amount of pay.
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CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The primary purpose of this study was to determine if increases in the
percentage of incentives to base pay, with total magnitude of pay held constant,
would result in increases in performance and, within this continuum, determine the
existence of an optimum level of percentage of incentives to base pay.
The data from this study supports prior similar research in showing that pay
with incentives resulted in observationally and significantly higher levels of
performance (i.e., an average of 21% higher in this study) than pay with no-incentives
(e.g., hourly pay). Under incentive conditions subjects also (a) reached a higher level
of task proficiency than subjects under no-incentive conditions and (b) continued to
show gradual increases in performance levels throughout the course of the study,
whereas the performance of no-incentive subjects stabilized upon attaining their
initial level of task proficiency. The fact that the performance of the subjects in the
incentive groups continued to gradually increase indicates that, at the end of this
study, the subjects’ maximum performance levels had not yet been attained. This
results in a number of questions that could be pursued in future research, such as:
1.

How long (many sessions) would it take for subjects to reach their

maximum level of productivity under their respective incentive conditions?

51
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2.

Would subjects maintain their maximum performance level under their

incentive conditions?
3.

Would there be variations in maximum performance for the different %

incentive/base pay levels?
Data from this study builds on prior research in demonstrating that the
different levels of percentage of incentive to base pay, with pay magnitude held
constant, (a) did not result in a significant difference in the levels of subject task
performance and (b) resulted in significant performance increases with as little as an
average of a 5% incentive to base pay. These findings contrast sharply with the
generally accepted “incentive potential” to affect motivation of 30%, as reported by
Fein (1970). The current study reveals that equivalently motivated performances are
obtained with incentive percentages below 30%. In considering incentive rates above
30%, Henderson (1989) indicates that a 30% incentive rate “provides a maximum
motivational impact on most workers” (p. 360) and Fein (1970) states that “increasing
the potential above 30% does not appreciably motivate employees to increase their
physical efforts over what would have been exerted under a 30% plan” (p. 28). The
findings of the current study support these conclusions in that no differences in
subject performances were obtained between incentive groups except when the data
for the six atypical subjects were removed, and then the differences noted between the
10%/30% and 60%/100% groups were relatively small. Thus, the findings of the
current study indicate that a maximum motivational impact will probably occur with a
% incentive to base pay level of less than 30%. However, especially in light of the
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differences in performance levels noted when the data for the atypical subjects were
removed, future research should continue to investigate the effects of different
percentages of incentives to base pay to refine or refute the findings of this study.
In summary, the conclusions of this study indicate: (a) that there appears to be
no specific relationship between increases in incentives and increases in performance
beyond the fact that base pay with incentives results in significantly higher
productivity levels than base pay alone (e.g., hourly pay), and (b) if there is an
optimum level of percentage of incentives to base pay, it is probably considerably
lower than the generally accepted 30% level in American industry. These results
support the behavioral theory that it is simply the “link” or the “contingency” in
which increases in performance directly result in increases in pay, that is the
controlling variable, as opposed to the percentage, and possibly the magnitude, of the
pay that is earned in incentives. With this link, performers have direct control over a
portion of their earnings through regulating their performance levels.
The secondary purpose of this study was to conduct this research under highly
controlled conditions, i.e., a laboratory analog work setting, to: (a) enable careful
control of the monetary incentives independent variable and (b) obtain accurate and
reliable measures of the work performance dependent variable, thus providing a solid
foundation upon which to build future research in this area. Along with the benefits of
conducting basic laboratory research, come limitations in the generality of the
research findings due to the differences between the highly controlled research setting
and the realities and complexities of the real work environment to which the results of
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this research should apply. The limitations in the generality of the findings from this
study are as follows:
1.

Subjects were undergraduate students performing a simulated work task

for pay in their spare time and thus were only an approximation of a real employee,
performing a real task, in a real job, for real pay. Subjects were also volunteers and
were free to withdraw from the study at any time with no repercussions. Future
research in this area would benefit greatly from the conduct of applied studies in
which the effects of monetary incentive variables are evaluated on the performance of
workers in real work environments.
2.

The actual time spent working and being exposed to the incentive

conditions by subjects was very brief compared to a real work setting and thus the
results of this study could be an artifact of such a brief exposure to the experimental
conditions. Subjects performed a work task for 15 work sessions of 45 mins each and
thus were exposed to the incentive contingency for the same brief amount of time,
although, this is a greater amount of work time and exposure to incentives than exists
in prior similar analog studies. Future research in this area would benefit from studies
designed to use greater amounts of work time and longer exposure to incentive
conditions.
3.

During the subjects’ participation in this study, they performed the work

task alone in an experimental room with the door closed and sessions were scheduled
such that there was minimal to no interaction or contact between subjects in this
study. Thus, subjects were isolated from interactions with others while working,
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although there were other materials available to serve as potential distractors (i.e.,
radio and magazines). An analog study that investigated the impact of incentives and
group size on the performance of individual workers (Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989),
noted that individual performances appeared to be affected by the performance of
others in the work group. Also, it is commonly known that workers typically impose
“rate restrictions” on each other under piece-rate pay systems. Thus, the isolated
context for the subjects in the current study was probably not a good approximation
of the typical work environment where interactions with others could affect levels of
productivity. Future research would benefit from the investigation of the impact of
work related social variables on the performance of individuals who are working
under monetary incentive contingencies.
4.

The earnings subjects received in this study were small in total amount

and of a discretionary nature which contrasts with the need basis for earnings of the
typical employee. The effects of incentive contingencies on worker performance may
differ when the income being earned is to meet the worker’s needed expenses for
daily living as opposed to being discretionary income. Again, future research with
incentive contingencies in applied settings could address this issue.
A related issue, not addressed in this study, but certainly a significant variable
in any longer term conclusions about the effects of incentive contingencies, is worker
preference for what proportion of pay should be a guaranteed base pay (e.g., such as
to meet fixed living expenses and needs) and what proportion should be more closely
linked to performance levels, i.e., incentives. This is an important area for future
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research because incentive systems employed by organizations will need to be ones
that employees prefer, or choose to participate in, if they are to be effective.
5.

The pay incentive contingency in this study was relatively simple and

easy for subjects to understand. Subjects were able to look at their incentive or widget
payment schedule for the amounts of pay for various levels of productivity. Subjects
were informed of the specific dollar amounts of their base pay and per widget
incentive pay but were not informed of the “%” amount as per the incentive
condition. Incentive contingencies in the real work environment are often not as
simple or as easy to understand as those represented in this study. They also may not
be as simply related to the workers’ moment to moment performance levels as
occurred in this study. Future research should assess subjects understanding of the
incentive contingencies, as well as approximate realistic incentive contingencies that
would be found in applied work settings.
A number of methodological constraints occurred in the design of this study
as a result of balancing the needs of the research versus the realities of being able to
implement the study. These constraints are described below:
I.

The design of this study required 75 subjects to complete all

experimental sessions. Considering the relatively low rate of commitment typically
obtained from volunteer student subjects, it was necessary to recruit a much larger
number of individuals to result in the number of subjects needed to complete the
study. This impacted the length of time it took to complete the study.
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2.

Participation as a subject in this study required a commitment of 15

sessions, of 45 min each, which is a considerable time commitment for a full-time
student. This impacted the research team’s ability to obtain commitments from
subjects initially recruited as well as being the stated reason for some individuals
dropping out.
3.

Being that the subjects were students, the implementation of this study

needed to coordinate with the University’s semester system for subject availability.
This resulted in three semesters and cycles of research implementation and related
management tasks, and thus the study took a full year to complete.
4.

Due to the fact that the independent variable was composed of real

dollars, money was necessary to conduct this study. It was necessary to solicit funds
from several sources and the funds that became available were limited. This impacted
decision making in terms of the number of sessions that could be conducted, the
number of subjects for which the study could be designed, and the total amount of
money that could be available per subject, thus impacting the actual dollar values of
the % incentive and base pay amounts.
Lastly, this study was not designed to evaluate subject satisfaction with the
various incentive levels experienced nor was any anecdotal information collected that
would indicate the level of subject satisfaction. Although, from a different
perspective, it can be noted that 75 of the original 105 individuals who initiated
participation in this study were satisfied enough with their various pay contingencies
to complete all experimental sessions. A closer look at the 30 individuals who chose
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to discontinue their participation may shed some light on this satisfaction issue.
Of the 30 subjects who dropped out of this study, 18 actually experienced the
incentive contingencies as per their respective % incentive group. Of these 18
subjects, two, three, four, four, and five subjects dropped out of the 0%, 10%, 30%,
60%, and 100% groups, respectively. These numbers represent 12%, 11%, 21%, 21%,
and 25% drop out rates as compared to the total numbers of subjects that were
originally assigned to each of these experimental conditions, again respectively. The
average amount of money earned per session by these individuals, during the sessions
in which they earned pay (i.e., met or exceeded the minimum performance
requirement), was $4.00, $3.73, $3.26, $2.90, and $2.22, while their average
performance levels during these sessions were relatively similar across groups
averaging 68,70,65, 69, and 58 widgets per session, for the 0%, 10%, 30%, 60%,
and 100% groups, respectively. Thus, as the % of incentive to base pay increased per
group and the magnitude of the average amount of pay earned per session decreased,
the % of individuals dropping out of the study increased. It would have been valuable
to assess subject satisfaction to determine the impact of the % incentive and pay
magnitude variables on the subjects’ decisions to drop out of the study. Thus, subject
satisfaction with the various % incentive pay levels, as well as the pay magnitude as
related to those levels, is another important area for further research.
In closing, in order for an incentive pay system to be attractive to a work
organization, the financial benefits of adopting the incentive system must outweigh
the costs of implementing it. Such an evaluation was beyond the scope of the current
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study but future research on monetary incentive systems, especially in applied
settings, should consider incorporating a cost-benefit analysis into the design of such
studies.
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CHAPTER V

FOLLOW-UP RESEARCH

In order to fulfill the need for practical knowledge about the effective
implementation of monetary incentive systems, research in this area continues. The
consistent Finding across all applied and laboratory studies, discussed previously in
the Introduction Chapter, that monetary incentives show substantial increases in
productivity over hourly pay, is continuing to be supported. Current research is
systematically addressing a number of monetary incentive variables and their
parameters as well as conducting replications to address the limitations in the
generality of prior findings. Recent research continues to build on prior findings and
continues to support the position that monetary incentives are a worthwhile employee
performance improvement strategy.
The recommendations for continuing research discussed in the prior
Discussion Chapter include suggestions about (a) specific variables to be investigated
as well as (b) generality issues to be addressed. Variables recommended include: (a)
continuing to investigate the effects of different percentages of incentives to base pay,
(b) investigating employee preference for proportions of base pay and proportions of
incentive pay, and (c) investigating the impact of work related social variables on the
performance of individuals working under monetary incentive contingencies.
Generality issues include: (a) conducting studies designed to use longer amounts of
60
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work time and longer exposure to incentive conditions, (b) approximating realistic
incentive contingencies that would be found in applied work settings and assessing
subject understanding of those contingencies, and (c) conducting research in applied
settings, evaluating the effects of monetary incentives on the performance of real
workers, in real work settings, earning real pay, who need to pay real expenses. A
number of these suggestions have been addressed in the recent monetary incentives
research.
The significant studies in this body of recent research are described in detail in
the remainder of this chapter. These studies are organized by their primary research
variable of interest and include the following topics and studies per topic: (a)
“Percentage of Incentives” - Austin, Kessler, Riccobono, and Bailey, 1996; Dickinson
and Gillette, 1993; LaMere, Dickinson, Henry, Henry, and Poling, 1996; and Leary,
Roberts, Trefsgar, Kaufman, Cassel, Jones, McKnight, and Duncan, 1990; (b) “PayPerformance Function” - Oah and Dickinson, 1992; Smoot & Duncan, 1992; (c)
“Satisfaction and Performance” - Oah, 1989; Sundby, Dickinson, and Michael, 1996;
and (d) “Individual Versus Group Context” - Farr, 1976; Honeywell, Dickinson, &
Poling, in press; London and Oldham, 1977; Stoneman and Dickinson, 1989;
Weinstein and Holzbach, 1973.

Percentage of Incentives

The results of the research presented in this dissertation were published in
1990 with Frisch and Dickinson as authors. Following publication of this study,
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several studies have continued to investigate the effects of different percentages of
incentives to base pay. Four studies are described below, three of which were direct
follow-ups to the Frisch and Dickinson study. Of these three studies, two are
laboratory investigations (Dickinson & Gillette, 1993; Leary et al., 1990), and one is
an applied study conducted in a work context that is unique to this body of research
(LaMere et al., 1996). The fourth is a recent applied study, also conducted in a work
context (Austin et al., 1996). This study does not specifically address the percentage
of incentives, although the percentage is determined in the description below, but
provides a novel and useful approach of determining individual incentives for
members of a work crew based upon a performance outcome rather than performance
itself.
In an unpublished laboratory simulation Leary, Roberts, Trefsgar, Kaufman,
Cassel, Jones, McKnight, & Duncan (1990) examined the impact of varying
schedules of incentive pay on individual productivity. A combined reversal and
multiple baseline within-subject design was used in which 50 college student subjects
were randomly assigned to one of ten 5-person groups. One group received the flat
rate condition only, and the remaining nine groups received the flat rate condition
plus one (8 groups) or two (1 group) incentive conditions. The various incentive
conditions were counterbalanced across the groups. The productivity task consisted of
constructing a “widget” made of 16 pop beads of several colors connected in a circle
in a prespecified sequence. Subjects produced widgets for 15 min sessions and the
number of widgets completed was measured. In the flat rate condition subjects
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received $1.00 per work session, and in the incentive pay conditions subjects received
either $.25, $.50, $.75, or $1.00 in base pay plus a 10 cent per widget incentive for
widgets produced over the minimum performance standard of 10 widgets.
Group means for the last five sessions of each condition were compared.
Productivity increased in all the incentive conditions as compared to the flat rate
baseline condition with productivity among the various incentive conditions
appearing comparable. The authors reported that this study resulted in incentive
conditions that were 63% to 90% of total pay. In closing the authors state that “this
study suggests that contingency pay conditions control productivity more than flat
rate conditions ... it is not clear that any particular incentive condition is superior to
the others in terms of control of productivity” (p. 2).
In a close review of the information presented in the above paper, the design
of this study is not as rigorous experimentally as most of the other studies in this
research area. Even though this study is lacking in experimental sophistication and
control, the findings are consistent with other recent research in this area.
Dickinson & Gillette (1993) conducted two experiments comparing the effects
of a piece-rate pay system, or a 100% of total pay incentive system, with the effects of
a base pay plus 30% of total pay incentive system. A within-subjects reversal design
was applied in each experiment in which all subjects were exposed to both pay
conditions, with the order of conditions reversed for half of the subjects to
counterbalance the design. Six “keyboard proficient” college student subjects were
randomly assigned to the two sequences of conditions per experiment, i.e., 3 to the
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ABA sequence and 3 to the BAB sequence. The piece-rate pay system was
represented by the A condition and the base pay plus incentive system was
represented by the B condition. Subjects performed a computer simulation of a check
verification task, which is a task typically performed by check proof operators in
banks. Subjects worked for three hour sessions in the first experiment and four hour
sessions in the second experiment. The rate of correctly verified checks per hour was
measured. Subjects were able to obtain feedback on how many checks they had
correctly completed at any point in time from the computer. At the end of each hour,
the experimenter obtained the subject’s hourly performance from the computer and
recorded it. At the end of each session, in the presence of the subject, the
experimenter plotted the subject’s performance on a graph and determined and
recorded the subject’s earnings. Subjects were paid for this performance in cash at the
beginning of the next session. Subjects attended at least one session per week and the
number of sessions per subject varied because phases were changed based upon the
subject meeting performance stability criterion.
In experiment one, sessions were three hours in length and the number of
sessions per subject ranged from six to nine, with two to three sessions per condition.
The average performance per hour standard was estimated at 1300 correctly
completed checks. In the piece-rate pay (100% incentive) condition (A), subjects
could earn a total of $5.00 per hour for meeting the average performance standard, at
a per check incentive rate of $.00385. In the base pay plus 30% incentive condition
(B), i.e., 70% in guaranteed hourly wages and 30% in incentives, subjects earned a
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guaranteed base pay of $3.50 (with no minimum performance required) and could
earn a per check incentive rate of $.005 for all correctly verified checks above a
minimum performance standard of 1,000. These two pay conditions were equated
such that meeting the average performance standard would result in equivalent pay of
$5.00 per hour. The results indicated that (a) two subjects in the BAB sequence
increased slightly throughout the study, (b) one subject in the ABA and one in the
BAB sequences had higher performances under the piece-rate condition, (c) one
subject in the ABA sequence had higher performance under the base pay plus
incentive condition, and (d) one subject in the ABA sequence had comparable
performances under both conditions. Also, the actual percent of total pay earned in
incentives in the base pay plus incentives conditions ranged from 0% to 37% as
compared to the planned rate of 30%. The investigators concluded that this
experiment indicated that “the proportion of total pay that was incentive-based did not
systematically affect performance rates” (p. 33).
Based on the results of experiment one, five changes were implemented in
experiment two: (1) a minimum performance requirement was added in order to
receive base pay; (2) the keyboard proficiency requirement for subject selection and
the minimum performance standard were decreased to 990 each and the average
performance standard was decreased to 1250; (3) more stringent performance stability
criterion were adopted for phase changes; (4) session length was increased by one
hour; and (5) individualized performance standards were developed for the second
conditions in each sequence using individualized data from the first conditions in an
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attempt to equate total amount of earnings between conditions, thereby minimizing
any potential confound that could be attributed to a difference in magnitude of
earnings between conditions.
In experiment two, sessions were four hours in length and the number of
sessions per subject ranged from nine to fourteen, with three to five sessions per
condition. During the two piece-rate pay conditions (A) in the ABA sequence,
subjects could earn $4.50 for meeting the revised average performance standard (1250
checks/hr), at a per check incentive rate of $.0036. During the base pay plus incentive
condition (B), which was the second condition in this sequence (ABA), the base pay
and incentive amounts were individualized. Each subject’s average level of
performance and amount of earnings from the prior condition (A) were identified and
used to determine: (a) the subject’s individualized minimum performance standard,
(b) the 70% base pay amount, and (c) the 30% incentive total and per check incentive
amounts. In the two base pay plus incentive conditions (B) in the BAB sequence,
subjects could earn a total of $4.50 for meeting the revised average performance
standard, $3.15 (70%) as base pay and $1.35 (30%), or $.0155 per check, as incentive
pay. During the second condition (A), the per check incentive piece-rate was
individualized using each subject’s average level of performance and amount of
earnings from the prior condition. The results indicated that: (a) only one subject, who
was in the BAB sequence, showed consistent responding to the two pay conditions,
having lower and more variable performance during the piece-rate pay than during the
two base pay plus incentives conditions; (b) the other two subjects in the BAB
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sequence showed no significant changes or trends across conditions, and (c) the mean
performance of all three subjects in the ABA sequence showed increases in
performance with each successive condition. The investigators conclude that “taken
together, the data indicate that the differences in pay systems did not influence
performance” (p. 46) and that the increasing performance trends displayed by subjects
in the ABA sequence “suggest that the order of exposure to the pay systems may have
influenced responding” (p. 47).
Thus, the results of both experiments revealed no systematic differences in the
effects of different percentages of total pay that were incentive-based. This outcome is
consistent with previous studies and reinforces the position that it is the contingency
between pay and performance, as opposed to the magnitude of this relationship, that
is the significant factor in influencing performance.
This study not only provides a replication of prior findings with a different
comparison of incentive contingencies, but also builds on prior laboratory studies by
(a) having conducted considerably longer work sessions, more closely approximating
a work day; (b) using an analog task that is very close in similarity to the real work
task; (c) providing pay amounts that closely approximate what one would make in a
part-time job, because of the increased work time per session and somewhat higher
pay rates; and (d) providing subjects with their pay for work performed after a week’s
delay which more closely approximates the way pay is received in the work
environment. From an experimental design perspective this study showed the
potential existence of sequence effects, which was also noted in the Pilot Study
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section of the Method chapter above, perhaps indicating that a within-subjects
reversal design may not be the design of choice for comparing different levels of the
% incentives parameter.
LaMere, Dickinson, Henry, Henry, & Poling (1996) examined the effects of a
multiple component individual monetary incentive system on the job performance,
safety, and satisfaction of 22 truck drivers in the “rolloff’ division of a waste disposal
service company. A multiple-baseline across groups experimental design with two
groups was used to evaluate the effects of the incentive system, i.e., conditions
changed at different times for the two groups. The drivers were assigned to one of the
two groups by pulling names from a hat at a driver’s meeting. Baseline, in which the
drivers received their regular base pay, was 20 weeks for group one and 34 weeks for
group two. Following baseline, the multiple component intervention was
implemented (at week 21 for group one and week 35 for group two) which included
(a) individual and group feedback, (b) incentive pay, and (c) loss of incentive pay for
accidents. At week 49 for group one and 50 for group two, the first incentive increase
phase was implemented in which the incentive amounts were increased by 92% as
compared to the prior incentive phase, while base pay remained the same. This phase
lasted for 30 weeks, after which the study ended. Follow-up data were collected on a
weekly basis beyond the conclusion of the study for 116 weeks. Nine weeks after the
conclusion of the study, or at week 88 for group one and week 89 for group two, a
second incentive increase phase was implemented in which the incentives were again
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increased, this time by 57% compared to the prior phase, with base pay again
remaining the same.
The “primary measure” used to determine incentive pay, as well as to evaluate
the effects of the intervention in this study, was the percentage of job points earned in
less time than baseline average. This performance measure equated job tasks and
corrected for the number of hours worked and miles driven, which were variables
over which the drivers had no control. This measure was the end result of a number of
activities which began with an analysis of the rolloff drivers’ overall job and resulted
in an identification of nine different types of job tasks or “jobs” that the drivers
performed. Point values were assigned to each of the nine job types based on the
relative amount of time taken to compete each job. During both the baseline and
intervention phases, the drivers self-recorded the number and types of jobs they
completed daily as well as their miles driven. During the intervention, the drivers
earned the specified points for completing the various types of jobs. On a daily basis
the drivers generated their own feedback by determining whether their performance
was above, below, or at average and by calculating the amount of incentives they had
earned for the day. At the end of the week the total number job points earned by a
driver was divided by the total number of hours worked for the week resulting in the
mean number of job points earned per hour per driver. This figure was then averaged
for all the drivers in the group resulting in a “secondary measure”, i.e., the mean
number of job points earned per hour per group of drivers, which was graphed and
posted in a communal area as weekly group feedback. Job satisfaction was also
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measured during this study by having the drivers complete the work and pay
subscales of the Job Descriptive Index (JDI), once during the baseline phase and once
during the first incentive increase phase. Several organizational cost-benefit measures
were also calculated which included: (a) weekly labor cost savings = baseline labor
costs - current labor costs, (b) net labor cost savings per week = total labor cost
savings - total amount paid in incentives per week, and (c) return on investment (ROI)
= net labor cost savings -s- the total amount paid in incentives.
Incentive values were derived from an analysis of the projected labor cost
savings from implementing the incentive system, and thereafter it was management’s
decision to return 25% of these projected savings to the workers through their
incentives. The actual incentives earned per driver were generated from a computer
system. The performance data, i.e., job points earned and miles driven, were collected
by the supervisor and provided to a payroll clerk to be entered into the computer. A
weekly report was generated that identified by driver, the: (a) number of job points
earned per hour, (b) miles driven per job point, (c) level of performance as compared
to baseline average, and (d) amount of incentive pay earned. The drivers received
their incentives as part of their regular weekly pay with the amount of the incentives
identified separately on their pay check stubs. As indicated above, loss of incentive
pay for “chargeable accidents” was also part of the intervention. Chargeable accidents
were driver accidents that were investigated by the police or by management, in
which the driver was found to be at fault. If drivers had a chargeable accident, the
driver forfeited his incentives for the week.
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Following implementation of the initial incentive intervention, performance
increased for both groups of drivers and this performance was sustained across all
incentive conditions. The incentive amounts across the incentive conditions were
2.6% for group one and 3.1% for group two during the initial phase, 6% for both
groups during the first increase phase, and 9% for both groups during the second
increase phase, thus resulting in increasing pay for the drivers. Consistent with results
of prior similar research, the increasing incentive amounts in the subsequent
conditions did not “consistently increase” performance beyond the initial increased
level. Driver performance remained at this increased level throughout the nearly fouryear follow-up. To evaluate the impact of the intervention on the number of
chargeable accidents, data were compared between the five month baseline phase and
the same time period one year later during the intervention phase. During baseline,
11 accidents (or 0.48 per week) occurred and during intervention, 8 accidents (or 0.35
per week) were reported. Therefore the authors concluded that accidents did not
increase. No significant differences were found in the drivers’ ratings of pay and work
satisfaction on the JDI subscales between baseline and intervention phases, thus the
investigators conclude that pay and work satisfaction ratings were not affected by the
implementation of the incentive system.
The authors report a labor cost savings of $ 17,631 during the initial incentive
phase (5 months) and $58,724 during the first incentive increase phase (10 months),
for a total labor cost savings of approximately $76,000, or an average of more than
$5,000 per month, for the first 15 months that the workers received monetary
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incentives. ROI was reported to be 4.4:1 during the first incentive phase and 2.8:1
during the first incentive increase phase, thus the increasing % incentive resulted in a
decrease in ROI for the company. The authors conclude that these results, “add to the
substantial literature on individual incentives by documenting increased productivity
sustained over a long period without accompanying increases in accidents or
decreases in workers’ satisfaction” (p. 385). They also point out that performance
increases were obtained with only a “small portion” of the drivers’ total pay being
earned in incentives, and performance did not increase with further increases in
incentives, which, once again provides a challenge to the accepted rale of “30%”
(Fein, 1970, Henderson, 1989). Thus, “once pay is tied to performance, strengthening
that link by increasing the amount or proportion of incentives may not lead to further
increases in performance” (p. 403).
Although this study has the experimental limitations that occur when
conducting applied research, its strengths as a replication in an applied setting and the
resulting benefits in generality more than overcome these limitations. This study was
applied in a real work setting, using real workers, doing their real job, and integrating
the monetary incentive system with the workers’ real pay system. The workers
appeared to understand the incentive system even though the system was relatively
complex. All components of the monetary incentive system were integrated into the
company’s processes as well as implemented by the company’s employees. The
monetary incentive system continued as an organizational system beyond the life of
the study - with follow-up, this incentive system lasted for four years. Lastly, the
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percentage of monetary incentives that impacted performance improvement in this
applied setting was relatively small, which further substantiates prior findings.
Austin, Kessler, Riccobono, & Bailey (1996) examined the effects of a “multicomponent intervention package,” which included monetary incentives, to improve a
roofing crew’s productivity. The roofing crew consisted of seven male roofers
employed by a roofing company and the work task selected for this study consisted of
“tearing off” or removing old roofs. An AB design “with repeated observations” was
employed in which workers were paid an hourly wage in the baseline phase and the
hourly wage plus monetary incentives, as part of the intervention package contingent
on performance, during the intervention phase. An outcome of the crew’s task
performance was measured because direct measurement of the task performance was
difficult to do. This outcome measure consisted of the percentage and dollars of
savings in labor costs, which were determined on a daily basis, by comparing the
actual daily labor costs with the estimated daily labor costs and calculating these
measures. Estimated labor costs were set through a competitive bidding process six
months prior to the study. Individual performances were also measured in terms of:
(a) hours worked and (b) “absences and tardies.” The multi-component intervention
package consisted of: (a) daily snack food reinforcers contingent on achieving the
daily performance goal during the previous day; (b) lunches provided by the
performance manager each time the crew accumulated a total of three “days saved”
(the cumulative difference between days estimated and days required to complete
work across days of work); (c) individualized daily feedback in which the items in a
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feedback chart (which are further specified below) were privately reviewed with each
worker by the performance manager; and (d) a weekly bonus check (which is further
specified below) with feedback, i.e., a copy of the individual’s chart, displaying the
weekly and cumulative project bonus earned. The individualized daily feedback was
provided in two forms, as follows: (1) a chart showing the: (a) dollar bonuses earned
for the previous day, week, and project to-date; (b) absences and tardies, with related
costs to the employee, for the week and project; and (c) hours worked for the previous
day, week, and project; and (2) a graph showing the cumulative dollar bonus amount
earned by the individual across project days. The weekly bonus check was provided
separately from the individuals hourly pay check and included the individual worker’s
portion of the crew’s monetary incentives earned from the labor cost savings. Forty
percent of every one dollar saved in labor costs was allocated to the work crew’s
monetary incentives. Each individual worker’s share of the crew’s incentive was
determined by a ratio equivalent to the ratio of his daily wages relative to the total
labor cost for the day.
Results indicated that during the baseline phase, the mean actual labor cost
was 141% of the estimated labor cost, which indicates that the company was loosing
money. During the intervention phase, the actual cost decreased to a mean of 81% of
estimated cost. The authors report that this indicates a “64% labor cost reduction”
when compared to baseline conditions. The total estimated labor cost for the 26 days
of the intervention phase was $31,913 (or mean per day of $1227) whereas the actual
cost was $22,545 (or mean per day of $867), which represents a total savings from the
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intervention of $9,368, assuming that the crew would have performed in such as
manner without the intervention so as not to exceed the estimated cost, which does
not appear to be the case from the baseline data. The authors conclude that “the effect
was immediate, substantial, and practically significant” (p. 70). The management and
work crew were given the opportunity to evaluate this intervention by completing an
anonymous questionnaire. The authors indicated that the responses to this
questionnaire were “generally positive” and indicated that the workers’: (a) job
satisfaction improved, (b) preferred the weekly bonuses when compared to a previous
year-end profit-sharing bonus, and (c) strongly supported continuing the intervention.
It is not possible to figure any % incentives per individual worker in this study
because data on individual earnings and bonuses, which varied between individuals,
are not available. Adequate data are available to determine the mean % incentives
earned per day for the crew as a whole. Both the % incentive as compared to base pay
and the % incentive as compared to total pay can be computed using the: (a)
estimated mean labor cost per day of $1227; (b) actual mean labor cost per day of
$867 (which is also mean pay for the crew per day); (c) mean labor cost savings, i.e.,
$1227 - $867 = $360; and (d) percent of labor cost savings per day allocated to the
crew as a bonus = 40%, i.e., 40% x $360 = $144. Using these calculations the: (a) %
incentive to base pay = daily crew bonus incentive -5- daily actual labor cost ($144 *
$867 = 16.6%); and (b) % incentive to total pay = daily crew bonus incentive
actual labor cost + daily crew bonus incentive) ($144

(daily

($867 + $ 144) = 14.2%.
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This study has weaknesses in that it is not possible to isolate and evaluate the
impact of the monetary incentive independent variable because: (a) this is a case
study design, and (b) the monetary incentive variable is combined with a number of
other potentially reinforcing variables in the multi-component intervention package.
The strengths in this study are that it is an investigation of the effects of monetary
incentives in a unique applied setting with real workers and real pay, and where the
incentive system was implemented by the employees in the work setting. Also unique
in this study is the fact that the work performance was an interdependent task
performed by a crew with the incentive being determined on an outcome of the crew’s
performance and distributed somewhat differentially among the crew members (for
more discussion on interdependent tasks and differential distribution of monetary
incentives refer to the Individual Versus Group Context section below).

Performance-Pay Function

An extension of the focus on the relationship between the percentage of
incentives and work performance is the monetary incentive performance-pay
function. The concept of the performance-pay function has been applied primarily to
the thinking of the per unit value of a unit of work as related to a specified amount of
pay for that unit of work. That amount of pay can either stay consistently the same for
successive units of work, it can increase in value for successive units of work, or it
can decrease in value for successive units of work. Three performance-pay functions
have been identified in relation to these concepts. The linear function, which applies
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to most incentive research conducted thus far, the positively accelerating function or
exponential function, and the negatively accelerating function. Two studies have
addressed research questions about the monetary incentive performance-pay function
(Oah & Dickinson, 1992; Smoot & Duncan, 1992), which are described below.
Oah & Dickinson (1992) compared the effects of two types of monetary
incentive performance-pay function relationships, a linear function and an exponential
function, on worker productivity. More specifically, the investigators were interested
in determining if an exponential relationship between performance and pay would
increase performance more than a linear relationship. A “linear” performance-pay
function is one in which a specific and unchanging incentive amount is paid for each
piece or unit of work that is produced, resulting in a linear relationship between
performance and pay. An “exponential” performance-pay function is one in which the
incentive amount paid for each piece or unit of work is increased as productivity
increases, resulting in an exponential relationship between performance and pay. The
effects of these performance-pay functions were investigated using a between-groups
experimental design with two groups, one group per pay function. Forty college
student subjects were randomly assigned to the two groups, resulting in 20 subjects
per performance-pay function condition. Subjects participated in fifteen-45 min
sessions during which they performed a computer simulation of a check proofing
task, which is a task performed by check proof operators in banks. Subjects were able
to obtain feedback on how many checks they had correctly completed at any point in
time from the computer. The number of correctly completed checks per session was
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measured. At the end of each experimental session the experimenter, in the presence
of the subject, plotted the subject’s number of correctly completed checks on a graph
and determined and recorded the subject’s earnings. Subjects were paid for their
performance earnings in cash once per week.
All subjects received a base pay amount and earned incentives, according to
their performance-pay function condition, when their performance exceeded the
minimum performance standard of 490 correctly completed checks. The dollar
amounts of the two pay functions were equated at the “average” preincentive
performance level (based on data from pilot research) which was determined to be
585 checks. The dollar amount for completing the average performance of 585 checks
was set at $2.39 for both pay functions. Incentive payments were “capped” at 860
checks for both pay functions and thus no increase in earnings could occur for
performances above this level. For subjects in the exponential pay function condition,
their per check incentive increased exponentially as the number of checks completed
increased. Maximum possible earnings for 860 checks or more was $5.00. For
subjects in the linear function condition, their per check incentive remained constant
with a maximum earnings possible of $3.50 for 860 or more checks completed.
Observationally, the mean number of checks completed per session were
consistently higher for the exponential group than the linear group and the difference
increased with increasing sessions. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted
on the pooled means of the last five sessions for each group to determine if
performance was differentially affected by the two performance-pay functions. This
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analysis indicated that there was not a significant difference. To determine if the
exponential function increased performance more quickly than the linear function, an
ANOVA was conducted on the mean slopes of the regression lines of the data for the
two groups. This analysis also indicated no significant difference. The amount of pay
earned by the subjects in the exponential group was substantially more than the pay
earned by the subjects in the linear group. To determine if this difference in pay was
significant, an ANOVA was conducted on the mean pay earned for all 15 sessions
which indicated that the pay differences were statistically significant. The authors
conclude that the “exponential performance-pay function did not result in greater
overall productivity, nor did it increase productivity more quickly than the linear
function” even though “subjects exposed to the exponential performance-pay function
earned significantly more money per session than subjects exposed to the linear
performance-pay function” (p. 106). Thus, productivity was comparable under both
the linear and exponential performance-pay functions. In combining these results with
results of similar recent research, the authors also conclude that “within certain
parameters that have yet to be determined, the amount of the monetary incentives and
the way in which they are related to performance may not influence productivity” (p.
109).
In an unpublished manuscript Smoot & Duncan (1992) report a series of four
experiments investigating the effects of a “flat” pay system and three performancepay functions (which are more specifically described below), i.e., linear, positively
accelerating, negatively accelerating. Experiment one compared the effects of these
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three pay functions, experiment two compared the three pay functions both with and
without feedback, and experiments three and four compared the three pay functions
under group versus individual work settings. All experiments were conducted using a
within subject, multiple baseline design with two conditions, baseline (or flat pay)
and incentive pay (one of the performance-pay functions). Subjects were college
students who worked in groups of four to six subjects. Subjects were randomly
assigned to one of three pairs of experimental groups. Each group was randomly
assigned to one of three performance-pay functions resulting in one pair of groups per
function. The performance task consisted of constructing a “widget” made of 16 pop
beads of several colors connected in a circle in a prespecified sequence. Subjects
produced widgets for 20 (experiments I and 2) or 25 (experiments 3 and 4) 15 min
sessions. A minimum performance requirement of 10 widgets occurred in all
conditions. The number of correctly completed widgets was measured as well as the
cost per widget for each performance-pay function system.
The pay systems were as follows: (a) flat pay in which subjects received a flat
rate of pay regardless of number of widgets produced, with the flat pay differing in
the four studies; (b) a linear pay function in which subjects were paid a piece-rate of
10 cents per widget; (c) a positively accelerating pay function in which subjects were
paid a piece-rate wnich increased incrementally with each additional widget
produced; and (d) a negatively accelerating pay function in which subjects were paid
a piece-rate which decreased incrementally with each additional widget produced.
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The authors report that the four experiments produced mixed results with
respect to widget productivity, performance variability, and cost-per-widget.
Although two consistent findings are identified: (I) the incentive pay generated
higher levels of productivity than did the flat pay, and (2) the three performance-pay
functions differentially affected performance levels and the cost-per-widget. The
authors indicate that the negatively accelerating pay system emerged as the most
reasonable option for pay system designers, even though there were less substantial
improvements in performance, because it was the most cost effective option. As has
been concluded by a growing number of researchers, these authors state that “it is not
the size of the incentive which controls performance, but rather the fact that there was
a pay-for-performance contingency in place” (p. 34).
The mixed results obtained in this study are inconsistent with the findings of
Oah and Dickinson (1992). Upon close inspection of the various experimental design
components and the data obtained in these experiments, it becomes apparent that the
level of experimental rigor is considerably less in the Smoot and Duncan (1992) study
than that found in Oah and Dickinson study. Therefore confidence placed in the
accuracy of the findings of the above study would be less. Some of experimental rigor
issues that may have contributed to the variability of the data obtained are as follows:
(a) there were only small differences in performance across conditions for the same
subjects and between subjects; (b) the experimental sessions were very short; (c) the
production task may have been one that, in a short period of time, may not show a
great degree of sensitivity to changing conditions; (d) there were small and uneven
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(due to drop outs) numbers of subjects in the groups; (e) condition changes between
many of the pairs of groups, as per the multiple baseline design, occurred only one or
two sessions apart which is insufficient to show any degree of control by the
independent variable; and (f) even though there were different groups receiving
different treatments, no tests of significance were employed to detect differences due
to the independent variable.

Satisfaction and Preference

Worker satisfaction with specific pay systems or the outcomes of particular
pay systems and worker preference for particular types of pay systems have been
somewhat addressed in the monetary incentives literature, albeit unsystematically.
Within the research reviewed in this document, the following studies have addressed
worker satisfaction and/or preference to some degree. Weinstein and Holzbach
(1973): (a) implemented a satisfaction questionnaire which indicated that subjects
were less “satisfied with their performance” in a differential-reward condition than in
an equal-reward condition, and (b) noted that satisfaction and productivity were
unrelated. Farr (1976) assessed “pay satisfaction” with various individual and group
incentive pay systems using a self-report rating scale and found no differences in
satisfaction levels between pay systems. Honeywell et al. (in press) conducted a post
study questionnaire that addressed “pay system satisfaction” and “pay system
preferences” which resulted in subjects reporting: (a) equal satisfaction with both
individual and group incentive pay systems, but (b) high performers expressing a
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preference for the individual incentive system and low performers expressing a
preference for the group incentive system. LaMere et al. (1996): (a) evaluated “job
satisfaction” using the work and pay subscales of the Job Descriptive Index and found
no significant differences in ratings of pay and work satisfaction between non
incentive and incentive conditions, and (b) pay and work satisfaction were not
affected by the implementation of the incentive system. Lastly, Austin et al. (1996)
implemented an anonymous questionnaire that resulted in the workers indicating that
their “job satisfaction” had improved and that they “preferred” the weekly bonuses as
compared to a prior profit-sharing bonus.
An overview of the above attempts to evaluate satisfaction and/or preference
in the research evaluating monetary incentives indicates that, at this point: (a) the
methodology is unsystematic, and (b) there is a lack of clarity with respect to the type
of satisfaction or preference being evaluated. The types of satisfaction specified in the
above studies include pay satisfaction, pay system satisfaction, job satisfaction, work
satisfaction, and performance satisfaction. These facets of satisfaction could be
equivalent, or could reflect very different attitudes. Needless to say, there needs to be
a clarification in terminology as well as a determination of what type of satisfaction is
relevant when comparing satisfaction for different pay systems.
Clarifying the differences between “satisfaction” and “preference” may be a
good place to begin. According to the common use of these terms, satisfaction
typically is used to indicate a verbally stated degree of contentment with an event,
situation, item, etc., and preference typically indicates a choice that an individual
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would make between alternatives. Even with different common usages these terms
seem to have been applied somewhat interchangeably in the research. Further
difficulty arises when subjects are asked to state a “verbal preference.” Lockhart
(1979) states that a “verbal preference (i.e., a verbal response that is usually
immediately consequated with something other than the preferred thing, such as
social approval for the statement) is not always a valid predictor of behavioral
preference” (i.e., a choice that is consequated with the thing chosen) due to the
differing reinforcement contingencies under which each operates and thus “it is hardly
surprising that the two methods often yield different results” (p. 21). Perhaps the
“mixed” and “conflicting” results (Dickinson & Gillette, 1993; Sundby, Dickinson, &
Michael, 1996) that have been obtained when worker satisfaction or preference for
different types of pay systems is examined, are partially due to the above factors: (a)
terminological confusion, and (b) reliance on self-reports. The remainder of this
section will be devoted to a discussion of two studies that attempted to develop a way
to assess worker preference using behavioral, rather than verbal-report measures.
“The success of any performance management system depends not only upon
its effectiveness but also on its acceptability by workers. If incentive systems are
unattractive to workers they will be hard to implement and maintain ...” (Frisch and
Dickinson, 1990, p. 31). In order for incentive systems to be acceptable to workers
they need to be systems that workers would choose or prefer over other alternatives.
Thus worker preference for types of monetary incentive systems as well as ways to
assess such preference are worthwhile areas for research. Dickinson and Gillette
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(1993) stale that, “Valid assessments of employee preferences and the factors that
influence them are best obtained when individuals are exposed to the alternative pay
systems” (p. 59). Unfortunately, “Research studies using behavioral choice measures
in organizational settings are difficult to conduct” (Dickinson & Gillette, 1993, p. 62).
In response to this difficulty, Oah (1989) and Sundby et al., (1996) have pursued the
development of analog simulations.
Oah, 1989 conducted a laboratory simulation to study worker preferences for
different pay systems with two purposes: (1) to evaluate the feasibility of using a
laboratory simulation to conduct research in this area, and (2) to investigate the
percentage of total pay workers preferred to earn in incentives under two different
monthly expense conditions. These monthly expense conditions were a percentage
relative to total income at either 85% or 95%. It was hypothesized that subjects would
select lower percentages of incentives in the higher monthly expense condition
because there would be less flexibility in the amount of pay that could be at risk.
A within-subject experimental design was implemented with 30
undergraduate student subjects who were divided into ten-3 person groups and were
exposed to various sequences of both conditions. Condition A consisted of the 95%
monthly expenses and condition B, the 85% monthly expenses. The sequences by
groups of subjects were as follows: AB for two groups, BA for two groups, ABmodified for one group, AA for two groups, and ABA for three groups. Each
condition included 24 simulated months except for the ABA sequence in which each
condition was 16 simulated months in length. Subject choice of the percentage of
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incentive pay to total pay for each simulated month was measured. The % incentive
pay to total pay choices were 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%. As the percentage of
incentives increased, so too did the potential earnings. Therefore, the riskier the pay,
the higher the potential earnings.
The simulation was in the form of a game board, in which a group of three
subjects would roll a die and earn play money. Subjects were provided with a list of
fixed and variable expenses that averaged either 85% or 95% of total their expected
earnings, depending upon the experimental condition in effect. Each subject’s work
productivity was simulated by a roll of the die where a roll of 1 equaled poor
performance, rolls of 2, 3,4, and 5 equaled average performance, and a roll of 6
equaled excellent performance. After each roll of the die, subjects were paid
according to the number on the die. Four rolls of the die, i.e., one per simulated week,
represented the subject’s work performances for one month. After 4 rolls of the die,
subjects paid their expenses and then selected their incentive percentage for the next
month. Subjects were paid for their participation with the earnings being distributed
competitively. At the end of the session the subject with the highest accumulated
earnings received $5.00, the subject with the second highest earnings received $3.00,
and the subject with lowest earnings received no pay.
The results indicated that 18 of the 30 subjects responded consistently to the
expense conditions, ten of whom responded as expected selecting lower percentages
of incentive pay when their expenses were higher. The author concluded that this
study suggests that it may be possible to use a simulation to examine factors that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

87
affect worker preference for different types of pay systems. The author also noted the
method of payment for participation in this study created a competitive group
environment that may have influenced responding more than the expense condition.
Thus, subjects may have selected higher incentive percentages in an attempt to obtain
simulated earnings that were higher than the earnings of the other group members,
even during the riskier 95% condition.
An overview of the pay choices made by subjects in this study reveals some
interesting information about incentive pay preferences. Subjects were given
opportunities to make pay system choices 1,440 times across all subjects and both
conditions, 936 of these choices were in the 95% condition and 504 of these choices
were in the 85% condition. Within these opportunities to select a pay system, subjects
in the 95% condition selected the 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% incentive options
5%, 29%, 35%, 22%, and 10% of the time, respectively, selecting the non-incentive
pay 5% of the time and incentive pay 95% of the time. Subjects in the 85% condition
selected these incentive options 5%, 13%, 42%, 30%, and 10% of the time,
respectively, also selecting the non-incentive pay 5% of the time and incentive pay
95% of the time. Note the high preference for incentive pay (95% for all incentive
conditions combined) as compared to non-incentive pay (5%) in both conditions. In
correlating the above data with the well substantiated findings that pay with
incentives results in significantly higher performance levels than pay without
incentives, it is interesting to see substantiation, although not unexpected, that
individuals may show a preference, through choice, for incentives.
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The purpose of Sundby et al.’s (1996) study was to “extend Oah’s (1989)
introductory research” using a computer simulation that would prompt subjects in
using a “behavioral choice procedure.” The same expectation was held as in the Oah
study that subjects would be more likely to select higher percentages of incentive pay
when they were working under the 85% expense condition as compared to the 95%
expense condition. Five key changes were implemented in the design of this study as
compared to the Oah study, as follows: (I) a computerized simulation was used
instead of a game board; (2) subjects participated as individuals, not groups, and
payment was based on the individual’s accumulated earnings to eliminate the group
and competitive influences detected in Oah’s study; (3) to more accurately simulate
performance under incentive systems, the computer simulation created an increased
probability of excellent simulated performance if the subject selected incentive pay in
consecutive periods; (4) subjects had to borrow money if they did not have enough to
pay monthly expenses (although this never occurred in the study); and (5) subjects
selected a pay system once every 3 months instead of once a month as in the Oah
study.
This study was conducted using a within-subject counterbalanced reversal
design with ABAB and BABA experimental sequences. The independent variable
was the percentage of monthly expenses (fixed and variable) relative to total
“expected” earnings with two values, 85% which was condition A and 95% which
was condition B. Each experimental condition lasted for 24 simulated months or, in
other words, two simulated years. The study was completed by each subject in one 2-
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hr experimental session. Ten volunteer undergraduate students served as subjects with
5 subjects being exposed to each experimental sequence. Subjects were selected using
a short quiz on basic percentages and finances to determine if they had the
understanding necessary to perform the simulation. Subjects were paid for their
participation relative to their monetary amount remaining in the simulation at the end
of the session, with the computer calculating the actual amount of pay the subject
would receive. The dependent variable was the subject’s choice of the percentage of
total pay that is incentive-based, which could be 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 100%. As
the % of incentives increased, so too did potential earnings. The computer
automatically recorded the subjects’ choices.
The computer controlled all aspects of the simulation. The work performance
was simulated using a random selection procedure and could be poor, average, or
excellent The probability that a specific performance level would be selected
depended upon the sequences of incentive pay selected by the subject. If the subject
selected incentive pay at 25% or higher for two consecutive periods, then the
probability of being an excellent performer increased, if the subject selected 25% or
higher for three or more consecutive periods, the probability of being an excellent
performer increased to the highest level. At the beginning of the simulation and every
three simulated months thereafter, subjects selected the % incentive pay they desired.
Every four weeks the simulation required the subjects to pay their monthly expenses.
Upon completion of the simulation, subjects completed a three-question survey to
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assess their perceived understanding of the independent and dependent variables and
to determine whether boredom influenced their responding.
The results of this study indicate that only three of ten subjects “demonstrated
any control by the expense conditions.” Thus the independent variable did not
influence the responding of the majority of the subjects who completed the
simulation. More specifically, responding for one subject in the ABAB sequence and
two subjects in the BABA sequence were somewhat controlled by the independent
variable. Subjects in the ABAB sequence tended to start out selecting higher incentive
percentages than those in the BABA sequence and the 25%, 50%, and 75% incentive
percentages were selected under both 85% and 95% conditions. In the 85% condition
0% was selected the least often with 25% selected the most often and in the 95%
condition 100% selected the least often and 25% selected the most often. The author
states that “these findings would tend to demonstrate at least a miniscule amount of
control by the expense conditions” (p. 60). Subjects’ responding on the survey
indicated that: (a) they all understood the expense conditions, (b) most understood the
incentive conditions, and (c) boredom influenced the responding in half of the
subjects. The authors concluded that the simulation had potential given further
modification.
A close look at the data on the % incentive pay choices made by the subjects
is as follows. Subjects were given opportunities to make pay choices 360 times across
all subjects and both conditions, 180 of these choices were in the 85% condition and
180 of these choices were in the 95% condition. Within these opportunities to select a
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specific pay incentive level, subjects in the 85% condition selected the 0%, 25%,
50%, 75%, and 100% incentive options 11%, 32%, 22%, 21%, and 14% of the time,
respectively, selecting the non-incentive pay 11% of the time and incentive pay 89%
of the time. Subjects in the 95% condition selected these incentive options 15%, 37%,
21%, 20%, and 7% of the time, respectively, selecting the non-incentive pay 15% of
the time and incentive pay 85% of the time. Combining these data for both the 85%
and 95% conditions, the high preference for incentive pay is apparent, 87% for all
incentive levels combined, as compared to non-incentive pay at 13%. Thus, as in the
Oah study, subjects selected incentive pay much more often than non-incentive pay.

Individual Versus Group Context

Several studies have investigated the effects of monetary incentives on
individual work performance in group or group versus individual settings. Three
studies that are frequently referenced by researchers are Weinstein and Holzbach
(1973), Farr (1976), and London and Oldham (1977). The relevance of these three
studies, two of which were described in the Introduction Chapter, is briefly discussed
below. Two more recent studies, Stoneman and Dickinson (1989) and Honeywell et
al. (in press), have examined the impact of group size on individual performance
under individual and group incentive conditions. These studies are described below in
more detail. A key factor to keep in mind when interpreting these studies is the degree
to which the group context creates an interdependence between individuals in the
group, which can be assessed by an identification of the following variables in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

92
studies: (a) whether the accomplishment of the task requires independent or
interdependent worker performance, and (b) whether the incentives are distributed
differentially (relative to individual performance) or equally (divided equally among
individuals in the group regardless of the level of individual performance).
In a laboratory study using college student subjects working together in 3person groups, Weinstein and Holzbach (1973) investigated the effects of equally and
differentially distributed group “rewards” under interdependent and independent task
conditions. The effect of these variables were evaluated using a 2 X 2 between groups
experimental design with 4 groups, thus each group of subjects was exposed to only
one condition. In the independent task condition, individuals worked on the task
independently in the group context and in the interdependent task condition, each
individual in the 3-person group shared one-third of the task, thus requiring the
performance of all three group members to complete one unit of the task. In all
conditions, a piece-rate monetary incentive pay system (the reward) was in effect. In
the equally-distributed reward condition, the monetary incentive pay was determined
by the total piece-rate performance of the group and divided equally among the group
members. In the differentially-distributed reward condition, the monetary incentive
pay was again determined by the total piece-rate of the group but distributed
differentially among group members based on individual performance with one-half
going to the highest performer, one-third to the middle performer, and one-sixth to the
lowest performer. The results of this study indicated that there was significantly
higher performance in the independent task performance condition than the
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interdependent condition and significantly higher performance in the differentiallydistributed reward condition than the equally-distributed reward condition. Subjects
also responded to a satisfaction questionnaire which indicated that they were less
satisfied with their performance in the differential-reward condition than in the equalreward condition. The authors also note that satisfaction and productivity were
unrelated. Thus, productivity was higher, but satisfaction lower in the differentiallydistributed reward condition.
In another laboratory study using college students working together in 3person groups, Farr (1976) investigated the effects of the presence and absence of
individual and group incentives on subject performance of an independent task in the
context of the group setting. The effect of incentive variables were evaluated using a 2
X 2 between groups experimental design with 4 groups, thus each group of subjects
was exposed to only one combination of individual and/or group incentives. In three
of the conditions where one or both of the incentive conditions were in effect, a piecerate monetary incentive pay system was implemented based on individual or group
performance. In the one condition where neither incentive condition was in effect, a
flat rate was paid. In the individual plus group incentives condition, total incentives
were based on the performance of the group but were differentially-distributed to
group members in the same manner as in the Weinstein and Holzbach (1973) study
above, in which one-half, one-third, and one-sixth of the total incentives were
distributed to the high, middle, and low performers, respectively. In the group
incentives only condition, the total incentives were again based on the performance of
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the group but were divided equally among the members of the group. In the
individual incentives only condition, each individual group member, still working
within the group context, earned individual piece-rate pay. In the condition where
neither the group nor individual incentives were in effect, group members earned an
hourly or flat rate of pay for their performance. All incentive conditions resulted in
higher performance than the no incentives, or hourly pay condition. The highest
performance was noted in the condition in which both individual and group incentives
were in effect but this pay system was perceived as least fair by the subjects. Pay
satisfaction was also evaluated and no differences were noted between any of the pay
conditions.
In a third laboratory study using college students working together in 2-person
non-interacting groups, London and Oldham (1977) compared the effects of three
group incentive, one individual incentive (piece-rate), and one individual fixed-rate
pay conditions using a between-groups experimental design. Subjects performed an
independent task in this study in the context of being linked with a partner with whom
they did not interact. In all incentive conditions a piece-rate was in effect based on
group or individual performance. The three group incentive conditions were, pay
based on the performance of the: (1) highest performer, (2) lowest performer, and (3)
group average. Subject performance was significantly higher under the group highest
performer piece-rate and the individual piece-rate than all other pay conditions.
The results of these three studies indicate that incentives earned for
performing independent tasks, whether earned (a) based upon individual performance
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alone or within the context of the group, or (b) based on the average performance of
the group, result in significantly higher performance than non-incentive pay. Such
incentives for independent tasks, yet based on the total group performance, tend to
result in higher performance levels when the incentives are distributed differentially
as related to the group member’s individual contribution, as compared to being
distributed equally among the members of the group. Yet, this form of incentive
distribution is perceived as the least fair. It is also noted that incentives resulted in
higher performances with independent tasks than interdependent tasks.
The differential effects of incentives in individual versus group contexts as
well as under independent and interdependent task conditions is an area in need of
additional research. This may be especially important from an applied perspective due
to the current prevalence of team-based work settings in organizational environments.
These interdependent group contexts are still composed of individuals whose work
performance needs to be motivated. In a theoretical and literature review paper by
Shea and Guzzo (1987) focusing on “groups as human resources,” the authors refer to
two bodies of research that may provide useful information when ascertaining the
effects of incentives on the performance of workers in group contexts: (a) the
“distributive justice” literature, and (b) the “cooperation versus competition”
literature. Shea and Guzzo indicate that this literature appears to indicate that: (a)
competitive (differentially-distributed) rewards will result in higher performance
when work tasks are independent, (b) equally distributed rewards will result in higher
performance when work tasks are interdependent, and (c) competitive rewards will
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result in poor performance when work tasks are interdependent. They posit that
competitive rewards provided for interdependent tasks result in lower performance
because of the occurrence of “blocking” behaviors and the lack of occurrence of
“facilitating” behaviors (which are necessary for successful performance in the
interdependent task situation) on the part of the workers. As applied work
environments become more dependent upon groups performing interdependent tasks,
it may not be possible to identify and measure discrete individual performance levels,
and thus may not be possible to distribute incentives differentially. A recent case
study published in the applied behavioral literature, Austin et al. (1996), addresses
exactly these issues in using monetary incentives to improve the interdependent task
of removing old roofs by a roofing crew. This study was described in detail in the
Percentage of Incentives subsection above. Consistent with the recommendations of
Shea and Guzzo, rewards were distributed equally, and both performance and
satisfaction appeared to improve.
More currently, two studies have carefully investigated the impact of a
specific parameter of the group context variable i.e., group size, on the effects of
monetary incentives on worker performance. In the first study, Stoneman and
Dickinson (1989) examined the impact of group size on individual performance under
both individual and group incentive conditions. A combined within-subject, betweengroups design was used. The within-subject component used an ABA sequence in
which condition A was the individual incentive (base pay plus individual piece-rate)
condition and condition B was the group incentive (base pay plus group average
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piece-rate, equally distributed) condition. The between-groups component compared
the variable of group size. Each experimental group consisted of subjects working in a
small, medium, or large sized group. To equate the numbers of subjects per
experimental groups, the small condition consisted of five groups of two persons
each, the medium condition consisted of one group of four and one group of five
subjects, and the large condition consisted of one group of nine subjects. Twentyeight college student subjects were randomly assigned to these experimental
conditions. Subjects performed an independent work task which consisted of
producing widgets from nuts, bolts, and washers (the same widget as discussed in the
Method Chapter above). Subjects were paid a base salary of $1.50 and a per piece
incentive rate, group or individual (depending upon the condition), of 2 cents per
widget for each widget produced above 58. Experimental sessions were held three
days per week and lasted 45 mins each.
The results indicated that individual performance was not significantly
different under either the individual or group incentive conditions and did not differ
as a function of group size under either incentive condition. Some differences based
upon group size were noted by the authors as follows: (a) there appeared to be a
relationship between the range of performance differences between subjects and
group size, i.e., subjects in the groups of two had the greatest performance differences
and these performance differences decreased substantially as group size increased; (b)
there appeared to be no significant low or high performers in the largest group; and
(c) increasing performance trends were observed in three of the small 2-person
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groups- The authors discuss an expectation of the impact of the group parameter that
proved to be unfounded as follows:
As the group size increases, the link between an individual’s performance and
pay decreases. Because pay becomes less dependent on individual
performance (when pay based on the collective group performance of subjects
performing independent tasks, is equally distributed), one might expect
performance to decrease under group incentives in comparison to individual
incentives, and also expect the size of the decrease to be inversely related to
the size of the group. These expectations were not confirmed in the present
study... (p. 147).
The authors conclude that, “The results of this study suggest that group incentives
based on groups of under ten members may be as effective as individual incentives in
promoting employee productivity” (p. 146).
In the second study, Honeywell et al. (in press) partially replicated the
Stoneman and Dickinson (1989) research by investigating the impact of group size on
individual performance under both individual and group incentive conditions. Twenty
undergraduate students divided into two 10-person groups served as subjects, with
two subjects dropping out half-way through the study, leaving one 8-person group
and one 10-person group. A within-subject alternating treatments design was used to
evaluate the effects of the two incentive conditions. These conditions alternated each
session within each group of subjects. Subjects participated in experimental sessions
for four hours a day for two consecutive days, for a total of 14 sessions. Each session
lasted 20-min with a 10-min break between each session. Subjects performed an
independent task in which they sorted cards punched with varying patterns of holes
onto boards with corresponding wooden dowels. The number of cards sorted per
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session was measured. Subjects were paid a base salary of $1.00 per session for
sorting a minimum of 300 cards and a per piece incentive rate of one-half cent per
card for each card sorted above 400. In the group incentive condition the incentives
were based on the group performance average with incentives being equally
distributed to group members. Subjects received feedback on individual and group
performance levels, as well as their amount of money earned after each session, but
were not paid until they completed all sessions. Subjects were also given a $10 bonus
for completing the study. Upon completion of all sessions, subjects completed a post
study satisfaction and stress level questionnaire.
A statistical analysis of the card sorting data indicated no significant
differences between the individual and group incentive conditions for either the eight
or ten person group. Interestingly, the author observed that “although high performers
earned less money under group incentives, they did not lower their performance
accordingly, nor did low performers increase their performance as a result of
increased earnings or group contingencies” (p. abstract). With the post-study
questionnaire subjects reported equal satisfaction with the two pay systems.
When asked about preference, the high performing subjects chose the
individual incentive system while the low performing subjects chose the group
incentive system. The authors conclude that the:
Results suggest that although the relationship between performance and pay is
stronger with individual incentives than with group incentives, small group
incentives may maintain performance equally well. Nonetheless, high
performers may prefer to work under individual incentive systems in which
their pay is directly related to their performance (p. abstract).
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The above two studies, investigating the impact of the parameter of group size
on the performance of workers earning incentives, indicate that when subjects are
performing an independent task in the context of a group work situation, both
individual incentives and group-equal-distribution incentives may control
performance equally well. These studies also indicate that group sizes of ten or less,
will not affect performance differentially. Pay system satisfaction seems to be equal
under all these variables. Pay system preference appears to vary in relation to the
conditions that will enable the performers to maximize their earnings, i.e., high
performers will probably prefer individual incentives whereas, low performers will
probably prefer incentives that are equally distributed among group members.

Summary

The results of recent research continues to support prior findings in
demonstrating that pay with incentives results in significantly higher levels of worker
performance than pay with no incentives. Further, investigation into incentive
variables appears to indicate that different parameters of these variables, i.e., percent
of incentive, performance-pay function, individual versus group incentives, whether
in laboratory or applied work settings, do not result in differential effectiveness of the
performance-pay contingency. These findings continue to support the position that it
is the contingency in which pay is directly linked with performance that is the
significant variable.
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Due to the highly variable nature of designed monetary incentive
contingencies across various research settings, it is difficult to draw direct
comparisons from study to study. There are some general formats, if adopted by all
researchers, that would enable more effective comparisons of incentive studies. The
“% of incentive to base pay” and the “% of incentive to total pay” are two such
possibilities. Also, reporting dollar values for base pay, per unit incentive pay, total
dollars earned, etc., as per hours worked would be beneficial. If studies consistently
reported these types of descriptive factors about the monetary incentive system
implemented, a meta-analysis of the research would soon be possible which would be
valuable in drawing conclusions to monetary incentive research questions.
As briefly addressed in the Individual Versus Group Context section above,
another area for future research is the effectiveness of monetary incentive systems in
team-based work environments where workers are performing interdependent tasks in
group contexts. Due to the nature of interdependent work, the difficulty in obtaining
individual performance measures in relation to such work, the complications of
determining appropriate incentive distributions for collective work performance, and
the current growing prevalence of such types of work settings in organizations; the
knowledge of effective monetary incentive strategies to fit this context, may soon be
in high demand.
The research described in this dissertation has shown that for relatively small
amounts of money, organizations can reap the benefits from worker performance
improvements that can result in big savings and profits. The concept is simple and the
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evidence of effectiveness is available, but the real effectiveness of applications of
monetary incentive systems in work organizations lies in the appropriate design and
implementation as related to the specific organizational context. A number of design
questions that future research can help to clarify, as summarized by Dickinson and
Gillette (1993), Frisch and Dickinson (1990), and Oah and Dickinson (1992) are as
follows:
1.

What is the appropriate proportion of incentives to base or total pay?

2.

What is the minimum dollar amount of incentives necessary to affect

performance improvement and to be preferred by the worker?
3.

With what frequency should incentives be provided?

4.

How should lack of worker control over work related variables be

integrated into the monetary incentive system?
5.

How should measures and standards of performance be developed in

relation to the monetary incentive system?
6.

What proportion of the organization’s savings and profits, due to

increased worker performance under monetary incentives, should be returned to the
workers through the incentive system?
7.

To what extent should employees be involved in the development of a

monetary incentive system and what preferences or options should employees be
given?
Some more specific questions to be addressed in the design of base and
incentive pay components of a monetary incentive system are as follows:
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1.

For base pay: How much guaranteed pay is necessary to attract someone

to the job? How much guaranteed pay does the worker need to stay in the job? How
much guaranteed pay is demanded by unions or other influential entities?
2.

For incentive pay: What % incentive is attractive to workers and

considered fair? What % are the workers comfortable with? How much money, with
what range and flexibility, does the organization have to allocate to incentives? What
are the incentive preferences specified by unions? What should be the return on
investment for implementing monetary incentives? (The greater the return, the more
money that should be available to use for incentives.)
Monetary incentive system design issues that are currently well substantiated
include the following:
1.

Monetary incentive systems can be effective with relatively low

percentages of incentives to base or total pay.
2.

If the potential exists that the dollar value per unit of monetary

incentives will need to change, it will be more behaviorally expedient to attach a
lower dollar value to the incentive when it is first implemented and then increase it as
necessary, as opposed to attaching a higher dollar value first and then decreasing it.
Such a decrease will likely result in decreased, i.e., de-motivated, worker
performance.
3.

Feedback on daily performance is a necessary and integral part of

effective monetary incentive systems because it enables the linkage between daily
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work performance and the monetary incentives that are usually received at a later
date.
4.

Allowing for worker participation in system design and offering

preferences in system options may increase acceptance of monetary incentive systems
by workers.
Regardless of the remaining questions, with this growing body of knowledge
monetary incentive systems are becoming a proven strategy for motivating the
workforce and thereby improving productivity in organizations.
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Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008-5052

D ep a rtm en t or P sy c h o lo g y

<6Uh 383-IS30

Dear
This research project will examine how payment systems affect,,
worker productivity. You will be asked to attend approximately ten sessions, each of which will last 45 minutes.
The study will be conducted in Wood Hall, Room 272A. Sessions will
be scheduled at times that are convenient for you. During each session you
will be asked to assemble parts made from bolts, nuts and washers. The
amount of money you will receive per session will depend upon your
performance, although you can expect to earn between $2.00 and $4.00 per
session. You will be paid immediately following each session.
Your participation in this study is voluntary. If at any time you
decide that you no longer wish to participate, you may withdraw from the
study. In addition, your performance data will remain confidential If the
results of this study are presented publicly, your performance data will be
identified by number, not by your name. Finally, your participation will not
affect the grade you receive in any course.
If you would like to participate in this research study, please sign the
attached consent form and give it to the experimenter. If you have any
questions, or need clarification on any item discussed in this letter please ask
the experimenter or call me at 344-7914

Sincerely,
l!

7

Alyce M. Dickinson. Phi).
Assistant Professor
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informed consent form

THE EFFECTS OF PAYMENT SYSTEMS ON WORKER PRODUCTIVITY
I would like to participate in the research project being conducted by
Dr. Aiyce M. Dickinson that will examine the effects of payment systems on
w orker productivity. I understand that* (1) my participation is volunatry
and that I may withdraw at any time; (2) my performance data will remain
confidential; and (3) my participation will not affect my grade in any course.
Date:

Name (please print your complete name):

Signature:
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College af Arts ard Sciences
Oeoartment of Psycnoogy

Kalamazoo. Micmgan aSC08-5052
616 337-W93

W e s t e r n M ic h ig a n U n iv e r s it y

October 14, 1996

To Whom It May Concern:
The research protocol for this study was approved by Western Michigan University’s
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) prior to conduct, however,
substantiating verification could not be located by either the author or the HSIRB due to the
length o f time that has elapsed, although all informed consent forms have been retained.
Richard Wright, the current Chair o f the HSIRB, indicated that this letter was an acceptable
substitute for the letter o f approval, given the circumstances.

Sincerely,

Alyce M. Dickinson, Ph.D.
Associate Professor and Committee Chair
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Widget Payment Schedule
To earn your base pay. you must assemble at least 50 "good" widgets. For
each additional good widget that you assemble, you will receive $0.021. or in
other words, a little more than 2 cents. The following chart indicates how
much total pay you will earn for assembling the widgets.
Number of Good
Number of Good
Wideets Assembled Amount of Pav WidRStS Assembled Amount of Pav
1-49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

$0.00
2.50
2.52
2.54
2.56
2.58
2.61
2.63
2.65
2.67
2.69
2.71
2.73
2.75
2.77
2.79
2.82
2.84
2.86
2.88
2.90
2.92
2.94
2.96
2.98
3.00
3.03
3.05
3.07
3.09
3.11

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

$3.13
3-15
3.17
3.19
3.21
3.24
3.26
3.28
3.30
3-32
3.34
3.36
3.38
3.40
3.42
3-45
3.47
3-49
3.51
3.53
3.55
3.57
3.59
3.61
3.63
3.66
3.68
3.70
3.72
3.74
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117
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

$3.76
3.78
3-80
3.82
3.84
3.87
3.89
3.91
3.93
3.95
3.97
3.99
4.01
4.03
4.05
4.08
4.10
4.12
4.14
4.16
4.18
4.20
4.22
424
4.26
4.29
4.31
4.33
4.35
4.37
4.39
4.41
4.43
4.45
4.47
4.50
4.52
4.54
4.56
4.58

150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

$4.60
4.62
4.64
4.66
4.68
4.71
4.73
4.75
4.77
4.79
4.81
4.83
4.85
4.87
4.89
4.92
4.94
4.96
4.98
5.00
5.02
5.04
506
5.08
5.10
5-13
5.15
5.17
5-19
521
5.23
525
5-27
5.29
5.31
5.34
5.36
5.38
5.40
5.42
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Widget Payment Schedule

0% Group

You will be paid a wage at $4.00 per session. To earn your pay. you must
assemble at least SO "good" widgets.
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Widget Payment Schedule
To earn your base pay, you must assemble at least 50 "good” widgets. For
each additional good widget that you assemble, you will receive $0,005. or in
other words. 1/2 of a cent. The following chart indicates how much total pay
you will earn for assembling the widgets.
Number of Good
Widgets Assembled
1-49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Amount 9f P.3Y
$0.00
3.63
3.64
3.64
3.65
3.65
3.66
3.66
3.67
3.67
3.68
3.68
3.69
3.69
3.70
3.70
3.71
3.71
3.72
3.72
3.73
' 3.73
3.74
3.74
3.75
3.75
3.76
3.76
3.76
3.77
3.78

Number of Good
Widgets Assembled AmQUflt of P?Y

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

$3.78
3.78
3.79
3.80
3.80
3.80
3.81
3.82
3.82
3.82
3.83
3.84
3.84
3.84
3.85
3.86
3.86
3.86
3.87
3.88
3.88
3.89
3.89
3.90
3.90
3.91
3.91
3.92
3.92
3.93
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110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

$3-93
3-94
3.94
3.95
3.95
3.96
3.96
3.97
3.97
3.98
3.98
3.99
3.99
4.00
4.00
4.01
4.01
4.02
4.02
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.04
4.05
4.05
4.06
4.06
4.06
4.07
4.08
4f08
4.09
4.09
4.10
4.10
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.12
4.13

150
151
152
153
154
155

156
157

158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

$4.13
4.14
4.14
4.15
4.15
4.16
4.16
4.17
4.17
4.18
4.18
4.19
4.19
4.20
4.20
4.21
4.21
4.22
4.22
4.23
4.23
4.24
4.24
4.25
4.25
4.26
4.26
4.27
4.27
4.27
4.28
4.29
4.29
4.30
4.30
4.31
4.31
4.31
4.32
4.33
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Widget Payment Schedule

30% Group

To earn your base pay. you must assemble at least 50 "good" widgets. For
each additional good widget that you assemble, you will receive $0.013. or in
other words, a little more than 1 cent. The following chart indicates bow
much total pay you will earn for assembling the widgets.
Number of Good
Wideets Assembled
1-49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Number of Good

Ampun t ofPay
$0.00
3.07
3.08
3-10
3-11
3.12
3.14
3.15
3.16
3.17
3.19
3.20
3.21
3.23
3.24
3.25
3.26
3.28
3.29
3.30
3 .3 2 3.33
3.34
3.36
3.37
3.38
3-40
3.41
3.42
3.43
3.45

Widgets

Assembled

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Amount of Pay.
$3.46
3.47
3.49
3-50
3.51
3.53
3-54
3.55
3.56
3.58
3.59
3.60
3.62
3.63
3.64
3.66
3.67
3.68
3.69
3.71
3.72
3.73
3-75
3.76
3.77
3.78
3.80
3.81
3.82
3.84
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110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

$3.85
3.86
3.88
3.89
3.90
3.91
3.93
3.94
3.95
3.97
3.98
3.99
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.14
4.15
4.16
4.18
4.19
4.20
4.21

423
4.24
4.25
4.27
4.28
4.29
4.31
4.32
4.33
4.34 *
4.36

150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

$4.37
4.38
4.40
4.41
4.42
4.44
4.45
4.46
4.47
4.49
4.50
4.51
4.53
4.54
4.55
4.56
4.58
4.59
4.60
4.62
4.63
4.64
4.66
4.67
4.68
4.69
4.71
4.72
4.73
4.75
4.76
4.77
4.79
4.80
4.81
4.83
4.84
4.85
4.86
4.88

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Widget Payment Schedule

60% Group

To earn your base pay, you must assemble at least 50 “good" widgets. For
each additional good widget that you assemble, you will receive $0.021. or in
other words, a little more than 2 cents. The following chart indicates how
much total pay you will earn for assembling the widgets.
Number of Good

Number of Good

Widgets Assembled Amount of Pav

WidiKtS Assembled Amount fltfiK

1-49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

$0.00
2.50
2.52
2.54
2.56
2.58
2.61
2.63
2.65
2.67
2.69
2.71
2.73
2.75
2.77
2.79
2.82
2.84
2.86
2.88
2.90
2.92
2.94
2.96
2.98
3.00
3.03
3.05
3.07
3.09
3.11

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

$3.13
3.15
3.17
3.19
3.21
3.24
3-26
3.28
3.30
3.32
3.34
3.36
3.38
3.40
3.42
3.45
3.47
3.49
3.51
3.53
3.55
3.57
3.59
3.61
3.63
3.66
3.68
3.70
3.72
3.74
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127
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

$3-76
3.78
3.80
3.82
3.84
3.87
3.89
3.91
3.93
3.95
3.97
3.99
4.01
4.03
4.05
4.08
4.10
4.12
4.14
4.16
4.18
4.20
4.22
4.24
4.26
4.29
4.31
4.33
4.35
4.37
4.39
4.41
4.43
4.45
4.47
4.50
4.52
4.54
4.56
4.58

150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

$4.60
4.62
4.64
4.66
4.68
4.71
4.73
4.75
4.77
4.79
4.81
4.83
4.85
4.87
4.89
4.92
4.94
4.96
4.98
5.00
5.02
5.04
5.06
5.08
5.10
5-13
5.15
5.17
5.19
5.21
5.23
5.25
5.27
5.29
5.31
5.34
5.36
5.38
5.40
5.42
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Widget Payment Schedule

100% Group

To earn your base pay, you must assemble at least 50 "good" widgets. For
each additional good widget that you assemble, you will receive $0,029, or in
other words, almost 3 cents. The following chart indicates how much total
pay you will earn for assembling the widgets.
Number of Good
Widgets Assembled Amount of Pav Widgets Assembled
Number of Good

1-49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

$0.00
2.00
2.03
2.06
2.09
2.12
2.15
2.17
2.20
2.23
2.26
2.29
2.32
2.35
2.38
2.41
2.44
2.46
2.49
2.52
2.55
2.58
2.61
2.64
2.67
2.70
2.73
2.75
2.78
2.81
2.84

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100 ~
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

$2.87
2.90
2.93
2.96
2.99
3.02
3.04
3.07
3.10
3.13
3.16
3.19
3.22
3.25
3.28
3.31
3.33
3.36
3.39
3.42
3.45
3.48
3.51
3.54
3.57
3.60
3.62
3.65
3.68
3.71

110

$3.74

150

$4.90
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129
I ll
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

3.77
3.80
3.83
3.86
3.89
3.91
3.94
3.97
4.00
4.03
4.06
4.09
4.12
4.15
4.18
4.20
4.23
4.26
4.29
4.32
4.35
4.38
4.41
4.44
4.47
4.49
4.52
4.55
4.58
4.61
4.64
4.67
4.70
4.73
4.76
4.78
4.81
4.84
4.87

151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

4.93
4.96
4.99
5.02
5.05
5.07
5.10
5.13
5.16
5.19
5.22
5.25
5.28
5.31
5.34
5.36
5.39
5.42
5.45
5.48
5.51
5.54
5.57
5.60
5.63
5.65
5.68
5.71
5.74
5.77
5.80
5.83
5.86
5.89
5.92
5.94
5.97
6.00
6.03

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix F
Job Aids for Experimental Procedures
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JOB AID
FOR
RECRUITING SUBJECTS IN A CLASS

1.

2.

3.

Contact the class instructor ahead o f time and if the instructor
is willing to allow you to recruit subjects from his/her class, set
a day and time to m eet with the class to recruit subjects. Tell
the instructor:
a.

What this project is

about.

b.

It w ill take about 5 minutes to describe the project
to the class and state that you are here to recruit subjects
to participate.

c.

It will take another 5 to 10 minutes to pass the recruiting
sign-up sheets around the class (this depends upon how
large the class is).

Assuming that the instructor w ill allow you to recruit in
his/her class:
a.

obtain a handful o f "Subject Recuiting Forms" from the
file cabinet in the OBM Lab,

b.

arrive at the class afew minutes ahead

c.

remind the instructor why you are here.

o f schedule, and

When its time to talk to the class:
-take a deep breath,
-look directly at all the students in the class,
-sm ile,
-greet the class,
-introduce you rself,
-identify you rself,
-explain who you are in relation to the project, and
-explain why you are here.
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4.

A lso, explain the project at a brief level of detail (tell the
students enough so that they know what they would be getting
into, without giving away the "secrets" of the project), such as:
a.

This is a psychology experim ent studying the relationship
between pay and work performance.

b.

You will be asked to do a production task for 45 minute
sessions - producing widgets (you may want to explain
what a widget is and how it is produced).

c.

You w ill be paid between $2.00 and $4.00 per session in
cash at the end o f each session.

d.

We w ill need you for 15 sessions.

e.

We need you for a minimum of 3 sessions per week
(maximum of 5 or 6 sessions per week depending upon
whether we have experim enters on Saturday).

f.

We must be able to finish your 15 sessions before finals
w eek at the end o f the semester.

5.

Ask the students if they have any questions and respond.

6.

Tell the
them to
through
so that
on this

7.

Pass the form around the classroom to collect the names o f the
interested students. If you pass out one sign-up form per row
in the the class, then collect all sheets as each row finishes, the
process w ill go much faster.

8.

Thank the instructor for allowing you to recruit in his/her
class.

class that you w ill pass around a sign-up form for
sign on if they are interested in being a subject. Read
and explain the "Subject Recruiting Form" instructions
the students understand what information to put down
form.
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PARTICIPATION IN A RESEARCH STUDY
This research study will involve a simulated work task and the effects of
payment systems will be studied. If you participate, you will be paid
approximately $2.00 to $4.00 per session. A session will last about one hour
and you will need to be available for approximately 15 sessions. The days
and times for your participation will be scheduled at your convenience.
If you would like to participate in this study, please write the following
information below: name, phone number, days available, and times
available.

NAME

PBQNE-NUMBER

DAYS:
I1T V T h F S a

IIM E(S)
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RESEARCH ASSISTANT
JOB AID
FOR
SCHEDULING A NEW SUBJECT BY TELEPHONE

1.

Telephone the prospective subject.

2.

Orient the caller to your purpose in calling:
a.

Introduce yourself and identify who you are in relation
to the project.

b.

Remind the subject of his/her original contact with the
possibility of being a subject (e.g., he/she signed a
recruiting sheet in class, som eone gave you his/her name,
etc.).

3.

Get a commitment of interest from the prospective subject
before you continue (e.g., ask the subject if he/she is still
interested in being a subject in this project).

4.

If the subject is still interested, explain the project at a brief
level o f detail (tell the subject enough so that he/she knows
what he/she is getting into), such as:
a.

This is a psychology experim ent studying the relationship
between pay and work performance.

b.

You will be asked to do a production task for 45 minute
sessions - producing widgets (you may want to explain
what a widget is and how it is produced).

c.

You will be paid between $2.00 and $4.00 per session in
cash at the end o f each session.

d.

We will need you for 15 sessions.
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e.

We need you for a minimum of 3 sessions per w eek
(maximum o f 5 or 6 sessions per week depending upon
whether we have experimenters on Saturday).

f.

We must be able to finish your 15 sessions before finals
week at the end o f the semester.

5.

If the prospective subject is still interested at this point, set the
d a y s and tim e (s ) that the subject can meet with a scheduled
experimenter. (You w ill need your copy of the Master Schedule
in order to do this.)

6.

Set the sta rt date for the first session.

7.

Tell the new subject:
a.

Who w ill be his/her experimenter(s) throughout the
project.

b.

Who w ill be his/her experimenter for the first session.

c.

Where he/she is to com e to, e.g.:
-Wood Hall, Room 272A
-Experimental Analysis of Behavior Laboratory
-Wood Hall, 2nd floor, back hallway
-etc.

d.

e.

Note:

To wait outside the Laboratory when he/she arrives and
the experimenter w ill meet him/her.
To call the Laboratory ahead of time if he/she needs to
miss a session - phone number is 387-4490.
If this subject has sessions scheduled on Saturday, also
tell him/her:
-the outside doors will be locked,
-come to the door by the parking lot, east o f the
greenhouse (by the 151 classroom),
-the experimenter w ill meet you there to let you in.

8.

Ask the subject if he/she has any questions and respond.
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9.

Restate the subject’s s c h e d u le and sta rt date and tim e
before you close the call.

Note:

If you notice any hesitancy, uneasiness, unsurity, etc. in the
prospective subject, question him/her about the extent of their
interest in being a subject. Do not persuade the individual to
do something that they really are not interested in doing. Such
people usually do not show up or they may com e for the first
session or two and then ju st not show up any more. This is a
big waste o f our time and money, so w e need to be as sure as
possible that the people w e schedule as subjects have some
commitment, and hopefully some personal interest, in
participating in the full complement o f sessions needed.
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RESEARCH ASSISTANT
JOB AID
FOR
PREPARATION FOR A NEWLY SCHEDULED SUBJECT

Following the scheduling o f the d a y ( s ) , t im e ( s ) , e x p e r im e n te r ,
ex p erim en ta l room #, and start d a te for a new subject, the
Research Assistant must do the follow ing tasks to prepare for the
experimenter’s first day with the subject:
H in t:

Do these tasks as soon after the scheduling phone conversation
with the subject as possible. It is absolutely necessary that
these things are completed before the subject's start date so
that the experimenter has all the necessary materials available
and ready and so everthing will go sm oothly during the first
sessio n .

R em em ber:

Support your experimenter’s to help them to do their
job well and they will support you.

1.

Enter the scheduling information on your own schedule so that
you have this information available to you at all times.

2.

Update all experimenters' schedules who w ill be running this
subject.

3.

Start a "Subject Accountability" sheet for the new subject (i.e.,
write the subject's name and number on top of the sheet).

4.

Leave a copy of the updated Experimenter/Subject schedule for
the experimenter, preferably, several days before the subject's
start date.

5.

Prepare all the subject materials for the experimenter and
place these materials in their appropriate subject folder in the
file cabinet. Attach to these materials, a yellow Post-it with the
new subject's name written on it. These materials include:
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a)

"Experimenter Instructions and Script for First Session"
with appropriate last page attached which is determined
by the subject's assigned experimental group.

b)

"Consent Form"

c)

Subject packet which consists o f the following pages
stapled together:
Graph
"Data Worksheet"
"Widget Payment Schedule" (for the subject's
assigned experimental group)
"Receipt Form”

d)
6.

"Data Form" - enter the Subject’s name on the form

Update the large "Master Schedule" posted on the OBM Lab
wall, as follows:
a.

Enter the experimenter/subject information on the
Master Schedule o n l v the n ig h t b efore the start date
for the new subject - this means n o t before this time
and not after this time - or else you will cause a lot of
confusion for your experimenters.

b.

Select the appropriate name and color coded squares for
the experimenter.
Write the subject's name and number
on the squares. Post the squares at the correct day, time
and experimental room # on the Master Schedule.

7.

Contact the Experimenter to notify in advance about this new
subject and that a new schedule has been prepared for them of
which a copy is available.

8.

Follow-up by checking to see if everything went as planned
after the scheduled time fo r the subject's first session (i.e., ask
the experimenter, check the available documentation, look for
relevant "No Show" notes, etc.).
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"NO SHOW NOTE"
Dace •Exp'cer Name
Subject #:
Subject Name.Session # Missed:
Was Subject Contacted?:

YES

NO

If YES, what was the outcome?

Signed*.
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EXPERIMENTER
JOB AID

FOR
FIRST SESSION

If this is the subject's very first session, do the following items before the
session as well as the numbered items in the section labeled "Before the
Session":
Meet the subject and immediately go into the designated experimental
room for that subject.
Have the subject read and sign the "Consent Form".
**

Turn on the tape recorder.
Follow the instructions in the "Experimenter Instructions and
Script" and read the script to the subject. (Remember to obtain a
container of the five good and bad widget examples to use with the
script. Check these widget examples to make sure that they are
correct.)

“

Turn off the tape recorder after you have completed the instructions
and script and are ready to leave the subject alone to start widget
production.

**

Remove the tape from the tape recorder before you leave the room
and take the tape with you. The subject must not have an
opportunity to listen to this tape.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

EXPERIMENTER
INSTRUCTIONS AND SCRIPT
FOR
FIRST SESSION

KEY*:

(Experim enter in stru ctio n s are bolded and in parenthesis.)
Script that is to be read by the experimenter to the subject is in plain text
with points of emphasis in bold and sometimes in CAPITAL LETTERS.

(Experim enter:
1) M eet th e su bject and im m ed ia tely go into th e subject's
assigned exp erim en tal room . Conduct all o f th e follow ing
a c tiv ities in th e ex p erim en ta l room.
2) Before you read the follow in g Script to th e subject, have th e
subject read and sign th e “Consent Form**. The subject is to k eep
the fir st page and to return th e second page to you. T h e n you
and the su b ject h ave fin ish ed th is fir s t sessio n , place the sign ed
second page in the file la b eled “Signed Consent Forms" in the
second draw er of tb e file cabinet. No on e can participate as a
subject in th is research project u n less h e /s h e has signed th is
consent form .)

PROJECT AND SESSION DESCRIPTION
The purpose of this research project is to study the effects of payment
systems.
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During each session I will ask you to assemble widgets. This is a widget.
(Experimenter: Show th e subject an assem b led w idget.)
The sessions will be timed and w ill last for 45 minutes. I will tell you when
to start and at the end of 45 minutes I will tell you to stop.
I will then count the number of good widgets that you assembled and I will
pay you for this work.
At this time, I will also record on a graph, the number of good widgets that
you assembled. You may look at this graph at any time before and/or after
each session. Attached to this graph will be a “Widget Payment Schedule"
that will let you know how much you will be paid for the number of good
widgets that you produce. You may also look at this payment schedule at
any time before and/or after each session. A receipt form wtlJ also be
attached to this graph which you will be asked to sign each time that I pay
you. At the end of this study, this form w ill go to the Accounting Office at
WMU for purposes of our accounting for our use of research the funds.
If, during the session, you wish to take a break, there are magazines
available. You can go to the restroom at any time or just leave your work
station to take a break whenever you want to. Smoking is only allowed
inthe entry w ay of Wood Hall. You can also turn on the radio if you wish.

THE WIDGET
A correctly assembled widget is made w ith these parts that are assembled
on a bolt and are put together in this order (Experimenter: Show th e
subject th e d isassem b led parts 1 th rou gh 7 and the bolt. Then
assem ble th e w id g e t w h ile show ing th e order of th e parts):
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

nut
red washer (has a red painted stripe)
black washer (has a black painted stripe)
red washer (has a red painted stripe)
nut
blank washer (has no painted stripe)
nut
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As I stated earlier. I will be counting and paying you only for “GOOD’*
w idgets that you assembled. GOOD means that the widget that you assemble
must have the following characteristics:
1) All pieces must be assembled in the correct order.
2! The three painted washers (red, black, red) must all be lined up on
one side of the painted band. Notice that the painted hands often
have different widths but it is still possible to line them up on one
side.
3) The whole widget must be screwed together tightly There must
ab so lu tely be NO LOOSENESS - in other words. NOTHING should
jiggle.
Each widget that you assemble MUST meet these criteria in order for it to be
counted and thus in order for you to be paid for its assembly.
Here are some examples of widgets that have already been assembled.
Notice that some of these widgets are good and some of them are bad.
(Experim enter: You w ill have fiv e w id g e ts each o f w hich have th e
ch a ra cteristics id en tified in the fo llo w in g script. The w id g ets are
num bered 1 though 5 to correspond to th e d escrip tion s below.):
1) This is a good widget - notice how it is tig h tly assembled and the
painted bands are lined up on one side.
2) This is a bad widget - notice how lo o se it is and because it is so
loose, the washers move around and thus it is not possible for the
painted bands to stay lined up.
3) This is another good widget - Can you tell me why this is a good
widget?
4) This is a bad widget - notice that it is tight but the painted bands
are n ot lin ed up on one side
3 1 This is another bad widget - notice that the bands are lined up and
at first giance it seems light but if I touch the blank washer, it
m oves ior jiggles), and thus it is loose.
Before we start, I would like you to assemble 5 widgets. I will then look at
them and tell you if they qualify as good or bad widgets. (Experim enter:
W ait for the su bject to com plete th e f iv e w id g ets. Take a close
look at each w id g e t for quality. W hen y o u are tellin g th e su b ject
ab ou t the q u a lity of h is/h e r w id gets, p oin t out sp ecifica lly the
ch a ra cteristics th at q u alify each w id g e t as good or bad - as you
did above w ith th e exam ples.)
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GETTING THE FIRST SESSION STARTED
We are now ready to get you started with assembling the widgets.
If you have any problems or questions I w ill be right outside this room.
When the 45 minutes are up, I w ill come in to stop you and then count your
good widgets and pay you.
You will be paid a base wage of $
per session for a minimum of
assembling 50 widgets during the session. In other words, you m ust
produce at least SO w id g ets during the session in order to earn a n y pay.
For each widget produced above the 50 widgets, you will earn $0.0
per
widget, or in other words, a little more than _ cents per widget. So the more
GOOD widgets you assemble during the session, the more money you w ill
make. Remember: You m ust assemble a minimum of 50 w id g e ts per
session to earn any pay at all.
Do you have any questions before you get started?

(Experimenter: Leave a m od el w id g e t w ith th e Subject if th e r e is
n ot one displayed in th e e x p e rim en ta l room. Remember nsL to
include this m odel in your co u n t o f th e Subject's w id gets at th e
end o f th e session .)
You can go ahead and get started.

(Experimenter: Look at y o u r w a tch fo r the start tim e. L eave th e
exp erim en tal room that th e su b ject is in and sh u t th e door. W rite
dow n the start tim e and ca lcu la te and w rite down the stop tim e ,
all on the “Data W orksheet", so th a t you don't forget.)
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EXPERIMENTER
JOB AID

FOR
BEFORE THE SESSION

1.

Check the supply of widget parts in each experimental room that you
will use and replenish the supply as necessary.

2.

Obtain your own cash box. Check to see if you have sufficient funds.

CO

Obtain the subject packet(s) for the subjects you are going to run.
(If you obtain more that one subject packet, put the packets in a
folder and keep them in the folder at all times except when recording
a subject's data at the end of the session - and then only have that one
subject's packet outside of the folder.)

” Note: If this is going to be the subject's last session (session #15), obtain a
"Subject Debriefing Form" which you will have the subject complete
after the session.
4.

Obtain your cassette tape to place in the tape recorder for "After the
Session", (and for "Before the Session” if this is the subjects first
session).

5.

Obtain an empty widget container. Make sure that a towel is in the
bottom of the container to prevent the widgets from rolling around
during transport.

6.

Go to the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Laboratory (where the
Experimental Rooms are located) a few minutes before your subjects
scheduled start time.

7.

Meet your subject and take him /her to his/her assigned experimental
room.
(Make sure that you take the subject to his/her assigned experimental
room or else we will have schedule conflicts with other subjects and
experimenters.)
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8.

Remind the subject of his/her pay schedule. Ask your subject if
he/she would like to see his/her "Widget Payment Schedule" before
he/she gets started.

9.

Do n si conduct any other conversation about this research
project with the subject. (Please feel free to talk about anything else.)

10.

Start the subject.

11.

Note the subject's start time.
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EXPERIMENTER

JOB AID
FOR

DURING THE SESSION
"Note: If your subject does not show up for their scheduled session,
telephone him/her at their scheduled start time to notify that h e/she is
missing a session. Remind the subject of the day and time of his/her next
session. t'Your subjects phone numbers are on your "Experimenter/Subject
Schedule".) If you do not reach your subject at the session time, try again
later. Also leave a "No Show" note for the Research Assistant indicating the
Subject*, day and time of session missed.

1.

Write the subject's 'Time Started" on the "Data Worksheet".

2.

Calculate the "Stop Time" and write it on the "Data Worksheet".

3.

Also fill in "Date" and "Experimenter" on the "Data Worksheet".

4.

If your subject schedule allows you some free time during the session,
conduct one or more reliability count(s) on widgets from previous
sessions:
Obtain a widget container from the "Widgets for Reliability'*
area.
Obtain your reliability data sheet from the second drawer of the
file cabinet (titled, "Interobserver Agreement Form”).
Make sure that the widget container that you choose has a
yellow "Post-it" attached to it with the Subject * and Session *
written on it. Copy these numbers into the appropriate spaces
on your reliability data sheet as well as entering the date.
Count the numbers of good, total and loose widgets in the
container and enter your counts on your reliability data
sheet.
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Sort out the w idgets that have badly painted washers and place
these widgets in the "Bad Widget Bucket" for repainting.
Put away your reliability data sheet and place the widgets in
a container in the “Widgets for Disassembly" area.
5.

If your subject schedule allows you more free time during the session,
repaint some red or black washers from the "Bad Widget Parts"
container located in the "Widget Washers for Repainting" area.

6.If your subject schedule allows you even more free time during the
session, disassemble some widgets from previous sessions:
Obtain a widget container from the "Widgets to be
Disassembled" area.
Have a great time disassembling!
Sort the disassembled parts and place them in their appropriate
individual containers.
OR
Obtain the "Bad Widget Bucket" from the "Widget Washers for
Repainting" area.
Disassemble the bad widgets.
Carefully sort through the painted washers from these widgets
and place any badly painted washers in the "Bad Widget Parts"
container in the "Widget Washers for Repainting" area.
Place the rest of the widget parts in their separate containers in
the "Widgets for Disassembly" area.
7.

Keep an eye on your calculated stop time for the subject and stop your
subject on time. If you happen to forget to stop the subject on time,
make sure you note it on the "Data Worksheet" and in the "Comments"
section of the "Data Form". This will enable us to make the necessary
adjustments in the data.
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EXPERIMENTER

JOB AID
FOR

AFTER THE SESSION

1.

Stop the subject at the calculated stop time. For eiam ple, say. The
time is up.” or "It's time to stop.”

2.

Immediately thereafter, before you or the subject says anything else,
place your tape in the tape recorder and turn the "Record" function on.
(Make sure the switch on the microphone is on the "On" position or
else the tape recorder will not work.) Then state and record the
following information:
"Experimenter is
fvournam el
"Subject number i s ____________ .
"Session number i s ____________ .

3.

Count the widgets that the subject assembled, checking each widget
for quality.

4.

Show/tell the subject w hy each bad widget is bad.

5.

BE CAREFUL to only discuss the quality of the widgets. Do NOT
praise the subject for good work nor criticize for poor work. Try to
keep your conversation with the subject as neutral as possible. (This
is to prevent confounding our indepencfwariable.)

6.

Record the number of "Good Widgets" and "Bad Widgets" on the “Data
Worksheet".

7.

Chart the number of good widaets produced on the graph. Show this
graph to the subject. (The subject may also see any of the other pages
attached to the graph.)

8.

Look at the payment schedule to determine the amount of pay that
the subject earned.
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9.

Pay the subject this amount from your $ boi.

10.

Have the subject sign the receipt for payment (attached to the graph).

11.

Remind the subject about when his/her next session is and ask is
he/she plans to attend.

"Note: If this is the subject s last session (session *15). have the subject
read and complete (as desired by the subject) the "Subject
Debriefing Form".
12.

Tell the subject that you are done and that he/sh e may leave.

A fter th e subject lea v e s, do th e follow ing:
13-

Turn off the tape recorder and remove your tape. (Do not rewind the
tape.)

14.

Complete the “$$$ Accountability" sheet in your cash box with the
pertinent information for that subject and session.

15.

Carefully place the widgets in a container, cover the container, and
write the Subject* and Session* on a “Post-it" and adhere it to the
container lid.

16.

Replenish the widget parts supply in the experimental room that
your subject used. (This will be a great help to the next experimenter
who needs to use this room.)

17.

Put your cash box away in Alyce's office in the middle or bottom
drawer of the left hand side of the desk.

18.

Carefully carry this container to the OBM lab and place it in the
counter area labeled "Widgets for Reliability".

19.

Obtain the “Data Form" for your subject and transfer your data from
your "Data Worksheet" to this form and write any pertinent comments
on the back of the form.
(Comments should include anything that your think is
important or interesting in relation to the subject such as. a
comment by the subject about the experiment, OR they should
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include any unusual or unplanned happening that may have
occurred that could influence the experim ental results, OR
anything you would like to say.)
20.

File your subject's packet and data form in its designated folder in the
second drawer of the file cabinet.

21.

Put your cassette tape away in the second drawer of the file cabinet.

2 2 ." Leave a "No Show" note for the Research Assistant for any subject who
missed a sesison - include the subject's *, day and time of session
missed.
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JOB AID
FOR

CONDUCTING RELIABILITY

1.

Obtain a widget container from the “Widgets for Reliability” area on
the counter in the OBM lab.

2.

Obtain your reliability data sheet from the "Reliability" file folder in
the second drawer of the file cabinet (the data sheet is titled,
"Interobserver Agreement Form”).

3.

Make sure that the widget container that you choose has a yellow
"Post-it" attached to it with the Subject * and Session * written on it.
Copy these numbers into the appropriate spaces on your reliability
data sheet as w ell as entering the date.

4.

Count the number of good widgets and total widgets in the container
and enter your counts on your reliability data sheet.

5.

Do NOT complete the "Original Observer" nor '% Agreement" columns.
(Alyce will take care of this information.)

6.

Place your reliability data sheet back in the "Reliability" folder in the
second drawer of the file cabmet.

7.

Place the widgets back in the container and place the container in the
"Widgets for Disassembly" area of the counter in the OBM lab.
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Reliability Calculations
Proportion of incentives to Base Pev. W88 Stud/
!
i
1
Date
1Subject iSession IObserver 21 Total t Good lObserver
i * i *
1
iWidoetslWidoetsi
1!
1
i
•1
i
I
I
i
.... T-"1
1
1
I
1
1
1
1
1
1
i
I
j
1

I
I
i
1
1
1

I

!
i
1
I
i
I

j
i
1
I
i
I
I
l

1
i
1
l

I
l
1
;
1
i
1
!
1
1

I
I

I
I

i
1
I
1
1
1
I
1
1
l
i
i
i

i
I

.
i

l

l

l
! . .
i

i1
I
I
I
1
1
!
1
1
1
1
I
1
;
;
i
1
1
!
1
1
i
i
1
1
1
1
1
!
i
1

i
1
1
1
1
I
[l
1

•

1
1
I
i|

l
1I
!

1
1
1
1
1
I
I
!
i

i
i
1
1
1
1
i
>
!

1i
l

l

1
l
i
i
I
I
.
!
1
ll Total 1 Good ' Aoreements/ 1% Acreements
iWidoetsiWidoetsiDlsaoreementsi
1
!
!
I
l
i
t
i
i
i
;
I
I
I

I

1
1

'
I
!
1
I

_

I
I
i I t
1
I
!
1r
|I
|
l
l

‘
1

!
1
I
.

I
i
I
;
i

I
l
I

...

!'■

..
1

.

1
1
!
i
1
i
1
1
I
I

............

I
l
I
1

!
i

'
1
'
i
!
1
i
i
i
i1
|
1
l
1
1
!
I
1
!
!
!
1
1
1
!

.........

_
1

i
1
l

i
i
i
1
i
i

l
1
1
1
1
i
|
1
1

I
i

i

i
1
1
i
!
1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

156

JOB AID
FOR

DISASSEMBLING WIDGETS
1.

Obtain a blue widget container (that contains assembled widgets) from
the "Widgets for Disassembly” area on the counter of the OBM lab. Do
NOT take a widget container from any other area in the lab.

2.

Disassemble each widget in the container. There are drills available to
help you with this task in the bottom drawer of the file cabinet.

3

When you have finished, stack the empty blue widget container in the
area labeled "Empty Widget Containers '.

4.

As you disassemble the widgets, sort the widget parts into separate
plastic containers. (There are shallow clear plastic containers
available for this purpose.) Use one container for nuts, one container
for bolts, one container for red washers, one container for black
washers, and one container for plain washers.

5.

When you have completed disassembling widgets, take the containers
of separated widget parts to Experiemental Room *2 in Room 272A
(the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Laboratory) and dump the
widget parts in their respective larger containers that are stored in
Room “2. Make sure that there is NOT a subject working in this
room before you go in.

6.

Return the widget part containers to the "Widgets for Disassembly"
area on the counter of the OBM lab.

7.

If you used the drill, return the drill to the bottom drawer of the file
cabinet.

Thank for y o u r help!
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JOB A ID
FOR
RECYCLING BAD WIDGET WASHERS

Repaint ttie bad widget washers. During repainting, do the following:
Paint a band on the edge of the washer.
Repaint red w ashers only with red paint and black w ashers
only with black paint.
Make sure to cover all splotches and tails that may exist on the
edge of the washer.
Make sure that the band you are painting on the washer has
very straight edges.
Place the newly painted washer on a paper towel to dry.
When the newly painted washers are dry. add them to their
container!s) for red and/or black w ashers in the "Widgets for
Disassembly" area.
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SUBJECT

DEBRIEFING
FORM
Thank-you for your participation in this research project. Tour participation
has been a contribution to:
‘Dr. Aiyce Dickinson s research on studying the effects of monetary
incentives on 'vork oerformance.
‘Carol Frisch's doctoral dissertation in the same area.
‘the development of an OBM research laboratory m the Psycnoiogy
Department at WMU. and
‘hopefully, a significant contribution to science.
We hope that your participation has been a beneficial and educational
experience for you. If you are interested in participating in our future
research as part of the research team, contact Dr. Dickinson or Carol Frisch

The study m which you participated is projected for completion during
December. 1*588. At this time we will be glad debrief you about the study in
which vou participated. If you are interested in knowing the details and
overall results of this study, please write your name and address below (for
Dec. 1988). When the study is completed, we will send you a written
rum mar.’ ni the reseach project and the results obtained

Name ___________________________
Address: _________________________
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November 13, 1996

UMI Dissertation Services
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346
To Whom This May Concern:
The original research presented in the enclosed dissertation has been previously
published by the Haworth Press, Inc., in the Journal of Organizational Behavior
Management (copyright registration # CIP 90-4369, year 1990). My dissertation
contains reproductions of the graphs and tables in the published journal article but
does not contain any duplication of the narrative text.
Attached are copies of my correspondence with the publisher about obtaining the
required copyright releases for UMI to reproduce and distribute my dissertation.
This correspondence documents that Haworth has agreed to my dissertation being
entered into UMI's dissertation database and to UMI's publication of my
dissertation abstract. Haworth has not agreed to the sale of copies of my
dissertation by UMI. Therefore, we need to establish "a selling restriction for
author only - copyright" (UMI restriction #2).
Sincerely
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Haworth
Press, me.
10 Alice Street, Binghamton, NY 13904-1580

tmprWfc
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Food Product* Rw*
PhotmocouWeql Product* Pnw*

The Haworth Medteal R *
intmoMonoi Burtn— Rr—
Th« Haworth Pastoral Proa

NowYork • London

October 17,1996

Carol Frisch
P.O. Box 131
Oshtemo, MI 49077
Dear Carol,
I am writing in reference to your request to use your article in your dissertation and to
submit the writing to UML
In this instance, The Haworth Press, Inc. has made an exception and in that permission is
granted for you to let UMI put your dissertation into their data base, with the exception
that copies of the dissertation cannot be sold.
Carol, if you have any questions, I may be reached at 1-800-342-9678 Ext 316.
Sincerely,
Wanda Latour,
Rights &. Permissions.
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Hamngton Park Pres
Food Products Press
Pnarmaceutical Products Pros
The Haworth Medical Press
International Busneo Press
The Haworth Pastoral Pres
Haworth Maltreatment & Trauma Press

NawYorK • London

September 25,1996

Carol J. Frisch
P.O. Box 131
Oshtemo, MI 49077-0131

Dear Carol,
I am writing in reference to our phone conversation and letter pertaining to your request
to use your article in your dissertation and also to submit it to UMI.
Permission has been granted from The Haworth Press, Inc. to use the article for your
doctoral dissertation. Haworth can only give permission for your abstract to be used by
UMI. At this point in time Haworth does not allow full text o f an article to go into a data
base and for copies to be sold.
If you have any further questions I may be reached at 1-800-342-9678 E xt 316.
Sincerely,

Rights & Permissions
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September 1 1 ,1996
Wanda Larour, Manager
Permissions Dept.
The Haworth Press. Inc.
10 Alice St.
Binghamton, NY 13904-1580
Dear Wanda;
As per our phone conversations this week. I am planning to re-use my research, published in a
Haworth Press journal article, in my doctoral dissertation. As specified in the "Manuscript
Submission Form", Haworth provides a "full copyright release" for the purpose of "author re-use
of work" for "any work for which they are the sole Author". Therefore it is my understanding,
from this specification and our conversation, that no further permission is necessary for me to use
the content of this publication (i.e.. graphs, tables, and adaptations of the text content).
We also discussed my University's requirement that I submit my dissertation to University
Microfilms Inc. (UNO) Dissertation Services. UMI will enter my dissertation into their
dissertation data base, publish the abstract in their publication titled "Dissertation Abstracts
International", as well as offer copies of my dissertation for sale upon request. I have enclosed
UMTs pamphlet describing this process with the pertinent sections of information highlighted. In
my conversations with UMI, they state that the abstract will be published but that the further sale
of dissertation copies depends upon obtaining appropriate copyright releases, otherwise this
service will be restricted (i.e., the dissertation will not be published & will not be offered for
sale). This is the specific area in which I need your assistance. Will Haworth provide me with a
copyright release such that UMI can publish my dissertation and offer it for sale upon request? If
Haworth is willing to do so, please send me a copy o f this copyright release.
Lastly, I need to make a decision as to submitting a copyright registration for my dissertation and
I am unclear as to my rights in this regard. I would like to know your position in relation this,
being that my dissertation will include a large amount of information from my Haworth journal
article, for which we transferred the copyright to Haworth prior to publication. Also, please note
on page AS o f the application form within the enclosed pamphlet. I need to provide the previous
copyright registration number from my journal article. Can you provide me with this number?
My journal article, published by Haworth, is as follows:
Journal of Organizational Behavior Management, 1990, Vol. 11(1), pp. 13-33
Title: Work Productivity as a Function of the Percentage o f Monetary Incentives to Base Pay
Authors: Carol J. Frisch & Alyce M. Dickinson
Thank-you very much for your assistance and I will be looking forward to hearing from you.
Carol J. Frisch

P.O. B ox 131
Oshtemo, MI 49077-0131
Phone: 616/349-5342
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